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quences for the availability of information about the government
to the American public, for the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA),I the legislation that mandates broad public access to government documents, exempts classified information from its dis2
closure requirements.
Suspicious of the executive branch's use of the classification
stamp to deny FOIA requests, Congress in 1974 amended the Act
so as to require the federal courts to conduct de novo review of
classification decisions contested in FOIA suits. However, the judiciary, believing that it lacks the "expertise" necessary to conduct such review, has abdicated its legislatively mandated
oversight responsibility. Consequently, the classification decisions invoked by the executive branch to deny FOIA requests
continue to go unchallenged.
This article challenges the federal judiciary's contention that
it lacks the expertise to review the classification decisions that are
at issue in FOIA suits. By scrutinizing executive-branch classification, it reveals that classification is not the mystical process that
the courts seem to believe it is and demonstrates that federal
judges are fully qualified to review classification decisions.
I.

THE CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM, THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
ACT AMENDMENTS,

AND THE COURTS:

THE BAD, THE

GOOD, AND THE UGLY

A.

The Scope and Abuse of the Classification System

The scope of the security classification system is startling.
Reliable estimates suggest that the executive branch's inventory
of classified information exceeds one billion documents. 3 De1. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982).
2. Id. § 552(b)(1).
3. No recent estimates of the total inventory of classified documents exist.
However, in March of 1973 the St. Louis Post-Dispatch reported that in a meeting
between major news organizations and government officials it was estimated that
one billion documents were classified at that time. Atkins & Boyd, Classification
Reexamined, 332 FREEDOM OF INFORMATION CENTER REPORT 8 (1975) (citing St.
Louis Post Dispatch, Mar. 17, 1973). And even executive branch figures, which
probably are skewed in favor of the government, indicate that annual executive
branch classification activity exceeds declassification activity. See, e.g., INFORMATION SECURITY OVERSIGHT OFFICE, ANNUAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, FY 1985,
at 13, 17 (1986) (reporting 22,322,895 classification "decisions" and declassification of 8,107,047 "pages"); INFORMATION SECURITY OVERSIGHT OFFICE, ANNUAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, FY 1982, at 8-11 (1983) (reporting 17,504,611
"classification decisions" and 16,582,972 declassification of 16,582,972
"pages"). Thus we can conclude that the total number of classified documents

now in existence is at least the one billion reported in 1973.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol31/iss2/2

2

Dunn: Judging Secrets

1986]

JUDGING SECRETS

473

pending upon whose figures one chooses to accept, the executive
branch classifies from twenty to one hundred million new documents each year, 4 with the Department of Defense and the CIA
5
accounting for over ninety-five percent of the annual total.
Many knowledgeable government officials assert that most
classified documents should not be classified at all. For instance,
This one billion figure is consistent with other estimates. See English, Congressional Oversight of Security ClassificationPolicy, 1 GOV'T INFORMATION Q. 165, 170
(1984) (suggesting that total inventory includes 621 million pages of classified
material in National Archives and like number of documents in agency files);
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, EXECUTIVE CLASSIFICATION OF
INFORMATION-SECURITY CLASSIFICATION PROBLEMS INVOLVING EXEMPTION
(b)(l) OF THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (5 U.S.C. § 552), H.R. REP. No. 93221, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 37-38 (1973) (reporting testimony of Dr. James B.
Rhoads, National Archivist, that archives had accumulated 470 million documents classified during period beginning with end of World War II and extending to end of Korean War and concluding that archive figure was only
"fractional part of the total volume of classified material now in existence").
4. Government figures on annual classification activity are inconsistent.
The General Accounting Office (GAO), a bipartisan agency whose credibility is
widely accepted, stated in a 1979 report that the "actual total number of classification actions for any year is not known, but it could range from 70 to 100 million or higher." GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE
UNITED STATES REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: IMPROVED EXECUTIVE BRANCH OVERSIGHT NEEDED FOR THE GOVERNMENT'S NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION CLASSIFICATION PROGRAM 7 (Mar. 9, 1979). However, the annual reports published by
the Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO), the executive branch agency
that is responsible for monitoring the classification system, provide the following figures for annual classification activity for fiscal years 1979-1985:
1985
1984
1983
1982
1981
1980
1979

22,322,895
19,607,736
18,005,151
17,504,611
17,374,102
16,058,764
14,850,000

See INFORMATION SECURITY OVERSIGHT OFFICE, ANNUAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, FY 1985, at 13 (1986) (reporting 1981-1985 figures); INFORMATION SECUR-

ITY OVERSIGHT OFFICE, ANNUAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, FY 1980-198 1, at 10
(1981) (reporting 1979-1980 figures).

5. See INFORMATION SECURITY OVERSIGHT OFFICE, ANNUAL REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT, FY 1985, at 11, 13 (1986) (reporting figures showing that Defense
Department and CIA accounted for 95% of all classification activity in 1985);
INFORMATION SECURITY OVERSIGHT OFFICE, ANNUAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT,
FY 1984, at 11 (1985) (reporting that Defense Department and CIA accounted
for almost 98% of all classification activity in 1984); INFORMATION SECURITY
OVERSIGHT OFFICE, ANNUAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, FY 1983, at 11 (1984)
(reporting that Defense Department and CIA accounted for 97.87% of all classification activity in 1983); INFORMATION SECURITY OVERSIGHT OFFICE, ANNUAL
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, FY 1982, at 8 (1983) (reporting that Defense Department and CIA accounted for 97.66% of all classification activity in 1982).
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in testimony before Congress, William Florence, an Air Force security classification expert, stated:
I sincerely believe that less than one-half of one percent of the different documents which bear currently assigned
classification
markings
actually
contain
information qualifying even for the lowest defense classification under Executive Order 10501. In other words,
the disclosure of information in at least 991/2 percent of
those classified documents could not be prejudicial to
the defense interests of the Nation. 6
In addition former Supreme Court Justice Arthur Goldberg, who
at one time served as General Counsel to the CIA, testified that in
his experience "seventy-five percent of [the thousands of classified documents he had seen] should never have been classified in
the first place; another fifteen percent quickly outlived the need
for secrecy; and only about ten percent genuinely required re' '7
stricted access over any significant period of time.
Former Senate Republican Leader Howard Baker (R-Tenn.)
has leveled similar charges about improper classification. Baker,
who inspected hundreds of classified documents during the Senate Watergate investigation, in which he played an important
part, concluded that of the documents he had reviewed "at least
95 percent . . . should not have been classified in the first place
and that the Nation's security and foreign policy would not be
8
damaged in any way by public disclosure of these documents."
At the other extreme, not surprisingly, is the Reagan administration. In congressional hearings conducted in 1982, Steven
Garfinkel, the Director of the Information Security Oversight Of6. United States Information Policies and Practices-The Pentagon Papers: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Foreign Operations and Government Information of the House
Comm. on Government Operations (Part 1), 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 97 (1971). See also
The Freedom of Information Act: Hearings on H. R. 5425 & H. R. 4960 Before the Subcomm. on Foreign Operations and Government Information to the House Comm. on Government Operations, 93d Cong. 1st Sess. 228 (1973) (statement of Rep. Phillips)
("[W]e have sworn testimony before this committee by experts, who have handled classified information all their lives, that anywhere from 90 to 991/2 percent
of the documents that they have come in contact with were not really necessary
to be classified at all.").
7. United States Information Policies and Practices-ThePentagon Papers: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Foreign Operations and Government Information of the House
Comm. on Government Operations (Part 1), 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1971).
8. 120 CONG. REC. 36,874 (1974). For other similar conclusions, see Wolf,
Introduction to V. MARCHETTI & J. MARKS, THE CIA AND THE CULT OF INTELLIGENCE at xxiv (1974) ("Experts have estimated that up to ninety-nine percent of
the millions of documents classified ought not be classified at all.").
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fice, which is the executive-branch agency responsible for overseeing the classification system, testified that the administration
estimated overclassification to be "approximately five percent." 9
Because of the problematic nature of any assessment of the
accuracy of classification decisions-a subject explored later-and
because of the absence of any effective and disinterested classification oversight, it is impossible to gauge precisely the extent of
excessive classification. However, the figures proffered by both
sides, viewed in light of the credibility of those offering extreme
estimates of improper classification and the institutional forces
that undoubtedly lead the executive branch to underestimate
overclassification, suggest that overclassification, far from being
extraordinary, is common, and possibly pervasive.' 0
9. Executive Order on Security Classification: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Government Information and Individual Rights of the House Comm. on Government Operations,
97th Cong., 2d Sess. 146, 151-52 (1982).
10. See The Freedom of Information Act: Hearings on H.R. 5425 & H.R. 4960
Before the Subcomm. on Foreign Operations and Government Information to the House Committee on Government Operations, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 227 (1973) (statement of
Rep. Phillips) ("[T]he overwhelming evidence that we have obtained in our
hearings indicates that most, if not all, of the vast majority of documents that are
classified are overclassified."); HOUSE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, SECURITY CLASSIFICATION POLICY AND EXECUTIVE

ORDER

12,356, H.R. REP. No.

731, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 49 (1982) ("The Committee finds that abuse of classification authority and overclassification of government information continues to
be a serious problem."); GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, COMPTROLLER GENERAL
OF THE UNITED STATES REPORT TO CONGRESS: CONTINUING PROBLEMS IN DOD'S
CLASSIFICATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION 17 (Oct. 26, 1979) ("We
believe that . . . a serious problem exists within DOD [the Department of De-

fense] in that individuals who originally or derivatively classify information
either are not fully knowledgeable of the requirements of the order and implementing instructions or prefer to follow a course of action which would result in
a lesser penalty to them if they incorrectly classify information."); see also Statement by the President Upon Establishing a New Classification System and Directing the Acceleration of Publication of the "Foreign Relations" Series, 8
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DoC. 542, 543 (Mar. 8, 1972) ("The controls which have
been imposed on classification authority have proved unworkable, and classification has frequently served to conceal bureaucratic mistakes or to prevent embarrassment to officials and administrations."); Freedom of Information Act: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practiceand Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 70 (1977) (statement ofJohn Blake, Acting Director of the CIA) ("Prior to the enactment of Executive Order 11652 in 1972, it
was the practice to classify too much, to err on the side of overclassification
rather than to run the risk of not properly protecting sensitive information.");
HOUSE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, EXECUTIVE OPERATIONS, EXECUTIVE CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION-SECURITY CLASSIFICATION PROBLEMS INVOLVING EXEMPTION (b)(1) OF THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (5 U.S.C.

§ 552), H.R. REP. No. 221, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 40 (1973) ("There has been
virtually unanimous agreement-from the President on down-that serious
abuses of overclassification had marked the operation of the security classification system under Executive Order 10501."); id. at 100 ("[Tlhe committee's
findings and conclusions have documented widespread overclassification, abuses
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Improper classification of documents is a matter of serious
concern. Initially, there are the ramifications for the effective operation of the system itself. As Justice Stewart observed in the
Pentagon PapersCase,I' "when everything is classified, then nothing
is classified, and the system becomes one to be disregarded by the
cynical or the careless, and to be manipulated by those intent on
2
self-protection or self-promotion."'
More important, however, is the threat that improper classification poses to public availability of information about the government. The federal legislation that mandates public access to
government documents, the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA),' 3 exempts classified documents from its disclosure rein the use of the classification stamps, and other serious defects in the use of the
security classification system."). For a discussion of the history of abuse of the
classification system, see Note, Developments in the Law-the National Security Interest
and Civil Liberties, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1130, 1189-1243 (1972); see also Freedman,
Freedom of Information and the First Amendment in a BureaucraticAge, 49 BROOKLYN L.
REV. 835 (1983); Note, National Security Directive 84: An Unjustifiably Broad Approach to Intelligence Protection, 51 BROOKLYN L. REV. 147 (1984).
11. New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam).
12. Id. at 729 (Stewart, J., concurring).
13. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982). The Act provides, in pertinent part:
(a) Each agency shall make available to the public information as
follows:
(1) [e]ach agency shall separately state and currently publish in
the Federal Register for the guidance of the public(A) descriptions of its central and field organization and the
established places at which, the employees (and in the case of
a uniformed service, the members) from whom, and the methods whereby, the public may obtain information, make submittals or requests, or obtain decisions;
(B) statements of the general course and method by which its
functions are channeled and determined, including the nature
and requirements of all formal and informal procedures
available;
(C) rules of procedure, descriptions of forms available or the
places at which forms may be obtained, and instructions as to
the scope and contents of all papers, reports, or examinations;
(D) substantive rules of general applicability adopted as authorized by law, and statements of general policy or interpretations of general applicability formulated and adopted by the
agency; and
(E) each amendment, revision, or repeal of the foregoing.
Except to the extent that a person has actual and timely notice of the
terms thereof, a person may not in any manner be required to resort to,
or be adversely affected by, a matter required to be published in the
Federal Register and not so published ...
(2) Each agency, in accordance with published rules, shall make
available for public inspection and copying(A) final opinions, including concurring and dissenting opinions, as well as orders, made in the adjudication of cases;
(B) those statements of policy and interpretations which
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have been adopted by the agency and are not published in the
Federal Register; and
(C) administrative staff manuals and instructions to staff that
affect a member of the public; unless the materials are
promptly published and copies offered for sale...
(3) Except with respect to the records made available under
paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subsection, each agency, upon
any request for records which (A) reasonably describes such
records and (B) is made in accordance with published rules
stating the time, place, fees (if any), and procedures to be followed, shall make the records promptly available to any
person.
(4) ...
(B) On complaint, the district court of the United States in
the district in which the complainant resides, or has his principal place of business, or in which the agency records are situated, or in the District of Columbia, has jurisdiction to enjoin
the agency from withholding agency records and to order the
production of any agency records improperly withheld from
the complainant. In such a case the court shall determine the
matter de novo, and may examine the contents of such agency
records in camera to determine whether such records of any
part thereof shall be withheld under any of the exemptions set
forth in subsection (b) of this section, and the burden is on the
agency to sustain its action.
(5) Each agency having more than one member shall maintain
and make available for public inspection a record of the final votes
of each member in every agency proceeding...
(b) This section does not apply to matters that are(1)(A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or
foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified pursuant to
such Executive order;
(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency;
(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than
section 552b of this title [5 USCS § 5532]), provided that such statute (A) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in
such a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue, or
(B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld;
(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential;
(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which
would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in
litigation with the agency;
(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of
which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy;
(7) investigatory records complied for law enforcement purposes,
but only to the extent that the production of such records would
(A) interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B) deprive a person
of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C) constitute
an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) disclose the identity of a confidential source and, in the case of a record compiled
by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal
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quirements.14 Consequently, if the executive branch classifies
large numbers of documents and a significant portion of those
documents should not be classified, that improper classification
wrongly will bar public access to many documents.
A little arithmetic reveals the import of this relationship between improper classification and the availability of government
information. If only five percent-the most conservative estimate-of the one billion classified documents should not be classified, improper classification unjustifiably exempts fifty million
government documents from potential FOIA disclosure. Should
the estimate proffered by people like Justice Goldberg and Senator Baker-no wild-eyed radicals-prove to be more accurate,
classification abuse could wrongly shield nearly one billion government documents from public scrutiny.
Less susceptible to mathematical calculation is what can be
deduced about the significance of these figures to the availability
of government information. Reasonable people can certainly disagree about the validity of basing qualitative conclusions on
investigation, or by an agency conducting a lawful national security
intelligence investigation, confidential information furnished only
by the confidential source, (E) disclose investigative techniques
and procedures, or (F) endanger the life or physical safety of law
enforcement personnel;
(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency
responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions; or
(9) geological or geophysical information and data, including
maps, concerning wells.
Any reasonably segregable portion of a record shall be provided to any person
requesting such record after deletion of the portions which are exempt under
this subsection.

Id.
For a discussion of the legislative history and purpose of FOIA, see infra
notes 45-65 and accompanying text. Other relevant reviews include Cheh,Judicial Supervision of Executive Secrecy: Rethinking Freedom of Expression for Government
Employees and the Public Right of Access to Government Information, 69 CORNELL L.
REV. 690 (1984); Davis, The Information Act: A PreliminaryAnalysis, 34 U. CGi. L.
REV. 761 (1967); Note, Judicial Review of Classified Documents: Amendments to the
Freedom of Information Act, 12 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 415 (1975); Note, National Security and the Public's Right to Know: A New Role for the Courts Under the Freedom of
Information Act, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1438 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Note, National Security].
14. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (1982). For a discussion of the operation of the
(b)(l) exemption, see infra notes 16-24 and accompanying text; see also Note,
National Security Information Disclosure Under FOIA: The Needfor Effective JudicialEnforcement, 25 B.C.L. REV. 611 (1984); Note, The Freedom of Information Act and the
Central Intelligence Agency's Paper Chase: A Need for CongressionalAction to Maintain
Essential Secrecy for Intelligence Files While Preserving the Public's Right to Know, 58
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 350 (1982).
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quantitative data, the present controversy generated by the lawand-economics crowd providing a nice example of this. Compounding this theoretical difficulty is the fact that nobody has any
idea as to the composition of those documents that are improperly classified and thus improperly exempted from public access.
Nonetheless, it is safe to conclude that, whether it shields from
FOIA disclosure fifty million or one billion documents, executive
branch classification abuse poses a serious threat to public access
to information about our government.
B.

CongressionalAction

Concern about overclassification peaked in the early 1970's.
The Pentagon Papers episode, in which the government sought to
use the classified status of the documents at issue to keep them
secret, exposed the classification system to intense public scrutiny
and sparked congressional inquiry into overclassification and
other problems plaguing the system. 15 That inquiry resulted in
congressional amendment of the Freedom of Information Act in
1974.16

The original version of the Act's section (b)(1)-the "national security exemption"-excepted from disclosure documents
"specifically exempted by Executive order to be kept secret in the
interest of the national defense and foreign policy.' 7 In addition
the section provided for de novo judicial review of executive
branch decisions to withhold documents in cases in which requestors challenged those decisions.' 8 However, after extensive con15. See U.S. Government Information Policies and Practices-ThePentagon Papers
(Parts 1-9). Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Foreign Operations and Government Information to the House Comm. on Government Operations, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-3758
(1972). Legislative response to the publication of the documents came in the
form of hearings convened in the House of Representatives ten days after their
initial publication. See id. at 1.
16. Pub. L. No. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561, 1563-64 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552
(1982)).
17. Pub. L. No. 90-23, 81 Stat. 54, 55 (1967).
18. The section pertaining to review provided, in pertinent part:
On complaint, the district court of the United States in the district in
which the complainant resides, or has his principle place of business, or
in which the agency records are situated, has jurisdiction to enjoin the
agency from withholding agency records and to order the production
of any agency records improperly withheld from the complainant. In
such a case the court shall determine the matter de novo and the burden is on the agency to sustain its action. In the event of noncompliance with the order of the court the district court may punish for
contempt the responsible employee, and in the case of a uniformed service, the responsible member.
5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3).
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gressional hearings on the abuse of the classification system 19 and
a Supreme Court decision holding that courts, when conducting
de novo review in (b)(1) cases, were not to inspect the documents
at issue, 20 Congress amended the Act in two important respects.
First, Congress rewrote the (b)(1) exemption to provide that
agencies can only withhold documents that are "specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be
kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy
and ... are in fact properly classifiedpursuant to such Executive order.' '21
The second change expanded the role of the courts: "[T]he court
shall determine the matter de novo, and may examine the contents of
...agency records in camera to determine whether such records or any part

thereof shall be withheld .

"..."22

The intended thrust of the amendments is relatively clear.
Substantively, they sought to make it more difficult for the executive branch to deny freedom of information requests under section (b)(1). To deny disclosure of requested documents, the
government would now not only have to demonstrate that the
documents were classified pursuant to an executive order-the
sole requirement under the original version of the Act-but it
would also have to establish that they were "properly classified
pursuant to such executive order." 23 Procedurally, the amendments mandated a more active role for the courts, allowing them
to review the contested documents when deciding if the executive
branch had classified them properly. According to Representative Glenn English (D-Okla.), the chairman of the House subcommittee with jurisdiction over FOIA, "The . . . amendments
reflect[ed] an unwillingness on the part of Congress to allow the
Executive Branch to have complete control and unreviewable dis24
cretion to determine the classification of information."
C. Judicial Response to the Amendments
Whatever the theoretical merit and anticipated impact of the
19. See United States Information Policies and Practices-The Pentagon Papers:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Foreign Operations and Government Information to the
House Committee on Government Operations (Parts 1-9), 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 1-3758
(1972).
20. For a discussion of this case, see infra text accompanying notes 48-56.
21. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (1982) (emphasis added).
22. Id. § 552(a)(4)(B) (emphasis added).
23. The Act imposes the risk of nonpersuasion on the government agency.
See id. § 552(a)(4)(B).
24. English, supra note 3, at 168.
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1974 amendments, a system of increased public access to government information attributable to active judicial review of executive classification decisions has never materialized. The federal
courts have refused to conduct meaningful de novo review of executive branch classification decisions challenged in (b)(1)
litigation.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has decided all of the important (b)(1) exemption cases. 25 As a practical
matter, the court has all but eliminated in camera inspection from
(b)(1) litigation. In Weissman v. CIA, 2 6 decided in 1977, the circuit
declared that in camera inspection was to be used as a "last resort
in 'national security' situations." 2 7 Since then, the district courts
25. Every other circuit that has decided a (b)(1) exemption case has followed and relied upon the D.C. Circuit's case law. See Miller v. Department of
State, 779 F.2d 1378, 1387-88 (8th Cir. 1985) (citing Military Audit Project v.
Casey, 656 F.2d 724, 738 (D.C. Cir. 1981)); Doherty v. Department of Justice,
775 F.2d 49, 51-52 (2d Cir. 1985) (citing Military Audit Project v. Casey, 656
F.2d 724, 738 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Weissman v. CIA, 565 F.2d 692, 697 (D.C. Cir.
1977)); Diamond v. FBI, 707 F.2d 75, 79 (2d Cir. 1983) (citing Weissman v. CIA,
565 F.2d 692 (D.C. Cir. 1977)), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1004 (1984); Pollard v. FBI,
705 F.2d 1151, 1155 (9th Cir. 1983); Ingle v. Department of Justice, 698 F.2d
259, 268-69 (6th Cir. 1983) (citing Taylor v. Department of Army, 684 F.2d 99
(D.C. Cir. 1982); Military Audit Project v. Casey, 656 F.2d 724, 738 (D.C. Cir.
1981); Halperin v. CIA, 629 F.2d 144, 147-48 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Hayden v. National Security Agency, 608 F.2d 1381, 1381-84 (D.C. Cir. 1979)); Stein v. Department of Justice & FBI, 662 F.2d 1245, 1252-54 (7th Cir. 1981) (citing
various D.C. Circuit cases); Terkel v. Kelly, 599 F.2d 214, 217 (7th Cir. 1979)
(citing Weissman v. CIA, 565 F.2d 692 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Cox v. Levi, 592 F.2d
460, 463 (8th Cir. 1979); Ray v. Turner, 587 F.2d 1187 (D.C. Cir. 1978)), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1013 (1980); Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. v. Colby, 509 F.2d 1362,
1369 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 992 (1975).
26. 565 F.2d 692 (D.C. Cir. 1977). In Weissman the CIA resisted disclosure
of all or part of over fifty documents relating to an investigation of the plaintiff's
background. Id. at 693-94. The investigation had been initiated because the
agency desired to recruit Weissman as an operative. Id. at 693. The agency
submitted affidavits indicating that the documents that it had withheld under
(b)(l) contained confidential information including the names of agents and
their sources as well as agency procedures. Id. at 694. The district court ordered exemption of certain documents under (b)(1) on the basis of these affidavits. Id. On appeal to the D.C. Circuit the plaintiff argued that "(1) the agency's
affidavits were not sufficiently detailed to permit proper judicial scrutiny of the
agency's claims; and (2) that in camera inspection was necessary to test the veracity of the assertions in the affidavits." Id. at 696. The court of appeals rejected
the arguments, holding that the agency had sustained its burden of providing a
sufficient record, by affidavit, "to permit a legal ruling." Id. at 697 (citing
Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 824 (D.C. Cir. 1973)).
27. Id. at 697. The court reasoned that routine in camera inspection of
documents would be inconsistent with the court's duty to accord " 'substantial
weight' . . . to detailed agency affidavits setting forth the basis for exemption" in
accordance with congressional intent. Id. at 697 n.10 (citing S. REP. No. 1200,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1974)). Furthermore, the court noted that " [i]n camera
inspection in each FOIA case would create a staggering burden both for [the
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in the circuit have consistently declined to inspect contested
28
documents.
Having excused itself from the delicate task of actually inspecting documents, the circuit has turned its attention to-and
has made (b)(1) exemption cases turn on-the attenuated issue of
affidavit adequacy. More specifically, the circuit has busied itself
with deciding whether agency affidavits submitted in support of
nondisclosure are sufficient to justify summary judgment against
the requestor.
Abbots v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,2 9 the most recent of
these cases, illustrates the circuit's approach. The case arose out
of a FOIA request filed by a public-interest group seeking from
the NRC information "pertaining to the protection of nuclear facilities against terrorist attack." 3 0 The Commission denied the request, but the district court ordered it to disclose the requested
documents. 3' In reversing the district court and ordering the entry of summary judgment in favor of the Commission, the court of
appeals relied entirely upon Commission affidavits and wrote:
In determining whether an agency has properly
court of appeals] and the district court." Id. at 697 n. 11. See also Baez v. Department of Justice, 647 F.2d 1328, 1335 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("The court need not
review the documents in camera unless the affidavits are inadequate for a reasoned de novo determination").
28. See, e.g., United States Student Ass'n v. CIA, 620 F. Supp. 565, 567-70
(D.D.C. 1985); Miller v. Casey, 730 F.2d 773 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (affirming district
court decision to grant summary judgment on basis of agency affidavits without
conducting in camera review of requested documents); Salisbury v. United
States, 690 F.2d 966, 970, 973 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (affirming district court decision
to grant summary judgment on basis of "public affidavits" and affidavits submitted in camera); Taylor v. Department of the Army, 684 F.2d 99, 106-09 (D.C.
Cir. 1982) (reversing, solely on basis of affidavits, district court order to release
contested documents); Military Audit Project v. Casey, 656 F.2d 724, 738-41
(D.C. Cir. 1981) (affirming district court decision to grant summaryjudgment on
basis of agency affidavits without conducting in camera review of contested documents); Baez v. Department of Justice, 647 F.2d 1328, 1331, 1340 (D.C. Cir.
1980) (same); Hayden v. National Security Agency, 608 F.2d 1381, 1383 (D.C.
Cir. 1979) (affirming district court decision to grant summary judgment on basis
of agency affidavits submitted publicly and "classified affidavits" prepared for in
camera inspection), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 937 (1980); cf. Lesar v. Department of
Justice, 636 F.2d 472, 478 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (affirming district court grant of summary judgment based on inspection of some of contested documents and on
affidavits submitted by government). But see Allen v. CIA, 636 F.2d 1287, 1291
(D.C. Cir. 1980) (vacating and remanding district court grant of summary judgment to agency because district court wrongly relied exclusively on agency affidavits and suggesting that district court inspect contested document in camera).
29. 766 F.2d 604 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
30. Id. at 605.
31. Id. at 606.
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withheld information pursuant to exemption 1,
courts are required to accord substantial weight to an
agency's affidavits concerning the details of the classified
status of a disputed record. Accordingly, an agency is
entitled to summary judgment if its affidavits describe
the withheld information and its justification for withholding with reasonable specificity, demonstrating a logical connection between the information and the claimed
32
exception.
As this language makes clear, the court bases its (b)(1) exemption decisions exclusively upon affidavits submitted by government officials. Of course, if the affidavits submitted in (b)(1)
cases were sufficiently detailed, they might provide enough information to enable a judge to make a reasonable de novo decision
as to the propriety of the classification of the documents in question. However, a review of the affidavits relied upon by the courts
indicates that, notwithstanding the formal requirement that they
be specific, these affidavits are so general and vague as to pre33
clude intelligent de novo review.
Military Audit Project v. Casey, 34 a case decided by the D.C. Circuit in 1981, reveals the circuit's approach to agency affidavits, for
it reproduces extensive portions of affidavits that the court found
sufficient to justify summary judgment against the requestor. Military Audit concerned a FOIA request for information about CIA
involvement in efforts to raise a Soviet submarine that sank near
Hawaii in 1968. The CIA allegedly contracted with several companies controlled by billionaire recluse Howard Hughes to build a
huge floating platform, the "Hughes Glomar Explorer," that
32. Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Accord Miller v.
Casey, 730 F.2d 773, 776 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Salisbury v. United States, 690 F.2d
966, 970 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Taylor v. Department of the Army, 684 F.2d 99, 107
(D.C. Cir. 1982); Military Audit Project v. Casey, 656 F.2d 724, 738 (D.C. Cir.
1981); Baez v. Department of Justice, 647 F.2d 1328, 1335 (D.C. Cir. 1980);
Allen v. CIA, 636 F.2d 1287, 1291 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Lesar v. Department of
Justice, 636 F.2d 472, 481 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Hayden v. National Security Agency,
608 F.2d 1381, 1386-87 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 937 (1980);
Founding Church of Scientology, Inc. v. Bell, 603 F.2d 945, 951 (D.C. Cir.
1979).
33. For a critical discussion of the procedures employed by the courts in
conducting de novo review of agency classification decisions, see Note, supra
note 14, at 611. For a discussion of judicially created standards regarding the
form and content of agency affidavits, see Note, Administrative Law-Freedom of
Information Act-In Camera Affidavits in Support of Claimed Exemptions From Disclosure
Must Detail the Reasons for the Claimed Exemption for Each Document Sought, 27 VILL.
L. REV. 597 (1982).
34. 656 F.2d 724 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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would be used to recover the submarine. Shortly after word of
the project surfaced in the popular press, the Military Audit Project, a defense-oversight group, filed a FOIA request seeking copies of the contracts between the CIA and the Hughes companies
as well as copies of other documents relevant to the Glomar project. The CIA denied the request, refusing even to acknowledge
the existence of any of the requested documents. 35 The district
court, on the basis of government affidavits, granted the CIA's
36
motion for summary judgment.
In affirming the district court judgment Judge Wilkey "excerpt[ed] liberally from the affidavits whose sufficiency [was]
questioned, for the convenience of those who... may be guided
by our decision." 3 7 Representative of the excerpted affidavits is
35. Id. at 729-30. Two years after the plaintiff's initial request, the CIA
suddenly changed its position and agreed to release about two thousand pages
of the requested material. Id. at 735. The change in position apparently resulted from new policies initiated by the Carter Administration. Id. at 735 n.27.
At this point the government was willing to admit the existence of the Glomar
Explorer project and CIA involvement therein, but remained unwilling to release documents that would expose the "actual purpose" of the project or the
identities of certain parties involved in the retrieval attempt. Id. at 738-44. Furthermore, the CIA continued to protect withheld information regarding code
names of persons or projects, dollar amounts spent in connection with the project, and "information pertaining to methods employed to provide secret funding of the Glomar Explorer project." Id. at 748-50.
The plaintiffs argued that the CIA's release of the two thousand documents
proved that the agency was initially in error, "from which it follows that the
agency is fallible, and its affidavits, suspect." Id. at 754. The court of appeals
responded:
We emphatically reject this line of argument. If accepted, it would
work mischief in the future by creating a disincentive for an agency to
reappraise its position, and when appropriate, release documents previously withheld. It would be unwise for us to punish flexibility, lest we
provide the motivation for intransigence.
Id.
Furthermore the court reasoned that "release of over two thousand pages
of documents after a thorough review suggests to us a stronger, rather than a
weaker, basis of the classification of those documents still withheld." Id. (footnote omitted).
36. See id. at 728-34. The court of appeals affirmed the district court's refusal to grant discovery and held that the government's affidavits were sufficiently detailed to warrant summary judgment. Id. at 751. The court
acknowledged the importance of adversary procedures in the truth finding process, but reasoned that
[i]n national security cases, some sacrifice to the ideals of the full adversary process are inevitable. It is natural that the appellants should seek
discovery in the hope that they might turn up details of the government's position that might be turned to the appellant's advantage. In
national security cases, however, more detailed information itself may
compromise intelligence methods and sources.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
37. Id. at 738.
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one submitted by then Secretary of State Cyrus Vance:
To the best of my knowledge the United States Government has acknowledged only that the GLOMAR EXPLORER was owned by the United States, that it was on
a mission related to the national security and, more recently, that the Central Intelligence Agency was involved
in the program. I am aware of the numerous press reports concerning the purpose of the program and the
identity of other governments that may have been involved. I nonetheless believe that any confirmation or
denial of these reports, or the public disclosure by the
United States of the purpose of the program .

.

. could

reasonably be expected to cause serious damage to the
national security of the United States.
In international affairs, one deals with intangibles
and uncertainties. No one can predict with certainty
what damage would flow from public disclosure of further official information about the GLOMAR program,
but it is my judgment, shared by other senior officials in
the Department, that such disclosures could reasonably
be expected to cause serious damage to our national
38
security.
Another example is the affidavit submitted by Ernest Zellmer,
a CIA official upon whose affidavit the D.C. Circuit relied in affirming the district court's denial of the group's request for documents that included references to cryptonyms. Mr. Zellmer's
affidavit explained:
Cryptonyms are devised words that serve as a substitute for the identity of an activity or particular project,
and are utilized as a defensive mechanism against unauthorized disclosure .

.

.

.

The release of cryptonyms

makes it possible to fit disparate pieces together and devine [sic] the nature or purpose of a project that may
stand behind the cryptonym. In some instances the factual setting within which the cryptonyms appear is of
such a descriptive nature that the documents could reveal to the knowledgeable reader the true identity of the
9
activity or project protected.3
38. Affidavit of Cyrus R. Vance at 2-3, quoted in Military Audit, 656 F.2d at
741.
39. Affidavit of Ernest J. Zellmer at 8, quoted in Military Audit, 656 F.2d at
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These affidavits, which are representative of the affidavits
that the D.C. Circuit relies upon regularly in rejecting FOIA requests for documents that the executive branch asserts are properly classified, may be absolutely accurate, but they do not
provide any information that would enable a judge to decide
40
whether the requested documents are in fact properly classified.
The affidavits simply state broad principles and offer executive
branch conclusions about the propriety of the contested
41
classifications.
748 (footnote omitted). For other affidavits relied upon by the court in Military
Audit, see Affidavit of Stansfield Turner at 4-5, quoted in Military Audit, 656 F.2d at
749; Affidavit of Thomas B. Yale at 2-6, quoted in Military Audit, 656 F.2d at 74647; Affidavit of Ernest J. Zellmer at 3, 6-7, quoted in Military Audit, 656 F.2d at
739, 745.
40. Most of the (b)(1) opinions do not include quoted language from affidavits. For example of those that do, see Affidavit of Louis J. Dube, described and
quoted in Miller v. Casey, 730 F.2d 773, 775-76 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Affidavit of General James E. Moore, Jr., quoted in Taylor v. Department of the Army, 684 F.2d
99, 107-08 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Affidavit of General Edmund R. Thompson, quoted
in Taylor, 684 F.2d at 108; Affidavit of John J. Pramik, quoted in Baez v. Department of Justice, 647 F.2d 1328, 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Affidavit of Lewis J.
Small, quoted in Lesar v. Department of Justice, 636 F.2d 472, 482 (D.C. Cir.
1980).
In Baez the affidavit of the FBI special agent opined that "acknowledgment
of the details or specific targets and methods described in these documents
could lead to the disruption of foreign relations by precipitating possible diplomatic confrontations which could damage national security." Baez, 647 F.2d at
1336 (footnote omitted).
Allen v. CIA, 636 F.2d 1287 (D.C. Cir. 1980), is the only case in which the
court of appeals reversed a district court's grant of summary judgment in favor
of the government. In Allen, Judge Skelly Wright described the agency affidavits
as "conclusory, merely citing statutory standards." Id. at 1291 (quoting Hayden
v. National Security Agency, 608 F.2d 1381, 1387 (D.C. Cir. 1979)). His disposition of this case was consistent with his singular efforts to encourage a stronger
judicial role in (b)(1) exemption cases. For another example ofJudge Wright's
approach, see Ray v. Turner, 587 F.2d 1187, 1199-1222 (D.C. Cir. 1978)
(Wright, J., concurring). For a discussion of Judge Wright's (b)(1) analysis, see
infra note 65.
41. The Zellmer Affidavit that is quoted in Military Audit contended that
greater specificity would be damaging to national security. Military Audit, 656
F.2d at 742. The affidavit stated that "[e]ven to speculate publicly about specific
consequences that might flow from such disclosures would, in all likelihood, be
damaging, as other governments might feel constrained to react to such speculation by comments or measures." Id. (footnote omitted).
The court also described the Yale Affidavit, to which the Zellmer affidavit
referred, as sufficiently detailed. Id. at 745. This affidavit argued that disclosure
of the financial transactions surrounding the Glomar project would endanger
other sensitive CIA transactions:
Without secrecy in the attendant funding there is no chance that the
secrecy of programs themselves can be maintained. Knowing the direction and volume of money flow can be every bit as revealing as knowing
the commitment of manpower or hardware to a particular program.
Knowledge of the fact that a certain dollar figure is being expended

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol31/iss2/2

16

Dunn: Judging Secrets

1986]

JUDGING SECRETS

487

The judiciary's handling of (b)(1) cases amounts to nothing
pursuant to a contract with a certain corporation, or division of a corporation, is often enough to reveal the nature of the project being undertaken. By way of example drawn from the circumstances of this
litigation, it can be readily seen that public disclosure of the fact that
the United States Government was engaged in a contract with a company by the name of Global Marine, Inc., or that large amounts of "drill
string" were being purchased on behalf of the United States Government, would quickly lead to discovery and disclosure of the project
itself.
What may not be as readily seen, or what might be lost sight of in
view of the limited disclosure regarding the Glomar Explorer Project
that has taken place, is that the methods and procedures employed in
accomplishing expenditures without government attribution must be
safeguarded as well as the objects of these expenditures. The significance of this point is that it involves, not the success of a single secret
project, but the success of all such projects. When a program is undertaken, the success of which depends on there being no attribution of
any facet of the program to the United States Government, funds in
support of the program must be moved in a manner, such that their
movement cannot be traced to their actual origin, i.e., the Treasury of
the United States ....

in order not to draw attention to the fact that

something extraordinary is occurring, normal commercial practice
must be employed as far as possible. Security procedures normally associated with the handling of "classified" information by the Government cannot be employed in the commercial world without drawing
attention to the fact that it is a Government transaction, which is obviously self-defeating. Therefore, the security of the requisite financial
transactions is made to depend on their being indistinguishable from
the thousands of ordinary transactions with which they are enmeshed.
In effect, the sensitive transactions are lost against the background of
normal commercial traffic, and the ability to follow the trail of these
sensitive transactions is possessed by only a few willing individuals who
participated in this process. In this instant case, for the reasons set
forth above, payments of the sums prescribed in the contracts were not
made directly from the United States Government to the contractors.
Rather, several intermediaries, individual and institutional, were used
to conceal the true source of funds. While steps are thus taken to break
the payor-payee chain, the chain of transactions, including the identities of the intermediaries used, could be laid bare by matching dates
and amounts paid against the record of the payee contractor ....
If the records in this case were released in their entirety, any person gaining access to them could determine the precise times at which
particular amounts were paid and thus discover the sensitive channels
used in these transactions. The records would identify a named bank as
the depository of the Hughes Tool Company. The pertinent bank
records are accessible to both bank employees and employees of the
bank regulatory agencies who, knowing what they were looking for,
could identify the particular intermediary who effected the payment.
Thus, in effect, a key to unlocking some very sensitive information
would be placed in the hands of individuals not authorized to receive
such information and over whom there is no control from a national
security standpoint ....
... The trail of financial transactions could also surface other CIA
sponsored transactions, past or present. At this point the damage to
operations of the Central Intelligence Agency would be difficult, or impossible, to contain ....
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less than an abdication of the responsibility given it by Congress
when it amended the Freedom of Information Act in 1974.
Courts cannot make intelligent de novo decisions about whether
documents alleged to be exempt from disclosure "are in fact
properly classified" ifjudges refuse even to look at the documents
and if they place such heavy reliance on agency affidavits. 42 The
poverty of judicial oversight in (b)(1) cases is demonstrated by
one remarkable statistic: Although the executive branch has invoked exemption (b)(1) to deny over 8000 FOIA requests since
1974, 4 3 in not one instance has an executive-branch agency, pursuant to a court order, released to a FOIA plaintiff a document
Id. at 746. Even though the government's position is presented, the court is not
presented with any information upon which it may determine whether the documents are properly classified. The court is simply instructed to accept both the
accuracy of the government's assertions and the soundness of its conclusions.
42. On occasion the courts have acknowledged that their approach to (b)(1)
cases conflicts with the congressional mandate to conduct de novo review. In
Stein v. Department ofJustice & FBI, 662 F.2d 1245 (7th Cir. 1981), the court
discussed the inherent conflict, stating:
In its provisions for judicial review, the Act's scheme is awkward at
best. It is somewhat ironic that legislation intended to open up the
workings of executive agencies incorporates a scheme ofjudicial review
designed to be closed in large part not only to the public but to adverse
parties. The consequent dilemma for judges arises from the conflict
between their obligation to maintain the openness and adversarial nature of judicial proceedings and their responsibility to carry out the
purpose of the FOIA by obtaining sufficient information from the government so as to perform the review function mandated under the Act,
all without jeopardizing the legitimate interests of the government and
third parties in the confidentiality of withheld documents.
Id. at 1252. See also Founding Church of Scientology, Inc. v. Bell, 603 F.2d 945,
951 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (recognizing "some tension" between according great
weight to agency affidavits and "the court's duty in FOIA cases to undertake de
novo review"); Weissman v. CIA, 565 F.2d 692, 697 (D.C. Cir. 1977) ("In every
FOIA case, there exists the possibility that Government affidavits claiming exemptions will be untruthful.").
Commentators have also observed that, at least with respect to the cases
decided in the first few years after the enactment of the 1974 amendments, the
courts were not conducting de novo review in (b)(1) cases. See Marwick, The
Freedom of Information Act and National Security Secrecy: How It's Working After Two
Years, First Principles, National Security and Civil Liberties, Dec. 1976 ("The
courts have not merely been reluctant to replace the judgment of the executive
branch officials with their own; they have often been reluctant even to approach
that issue by examining the documents in camera ....
), reprinted in Freedom of
Information Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Procedure
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 633 (1977); Fox & Weiss,
The FOIA National Security Exemption and the New Executive Order, 37 FED. B.J., Fall

1978, at 1, 8-14.
43. In the ten years since Congress enacted the 1974 FOIA amendments
the Department of Defense and CIA alone have invoked exemption (b)(1), the
provision that exempts classified information from FOIA disclosure, 8799 times:
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Year

Defense

CIA

Total

1984
1983
1982
1981
1980
1979
1978
1977
1976
1975

1257
814
547
645
454
423
510
451
330
213

540
217
265
346
214
265
280
234
493
301

1797
1031
812
991
668
688
790
685
823
514

5644

3144

8799

See DEPARTMENT

OF DEFENSE, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT PROGRAM

SUMMARY OF THE REPORT TO CONGRESS

CY 1984:

2 (1985) (reporting 1984 Defense De-

partment figures); CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
ACT ANNUAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS FOR THE YEAR 1984, at 1 (1985) (report-

ing 1984 CIA figures); DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
PROGRAM CY 1983: SUMMARY OF THE REPORT TO CONGRESS 2 (1984) (reporting
1983 Defense Department figures); CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, FREEDOM
OF INFORMATION ACT ANNUAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS FOR THE YEAR 1983, at 1
(1984) (reporting CIA figures for 1983); DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FREEDOM OF
INFORMATION ACT PROGRAM CY 1982: SUMMARY OF THE REPORT TO CONGRESS 2
(1983) (reporting 1982 Defense Department figures); CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT ANNUAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS FOR
THE YEAR 1982, at 1 (1983) (reporting 1982 CIA figures); DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT PROGRAM CY 1981, at 2 (1982) (reporting
1981 Defense Department figures); CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, FREEDOM
OF INFORMATION ACT ANNUAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS FOR THE YEAR 1981, at 1
(1982) (reporting 1981 CIA figures); DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FREEDOM OF IN-

CY 1980: SUMMARY OF THE
(1981) (reporting 1980 Defense Department figures);

FORMATION ACT PROGRAM

REPORT TO CONGRESS

2

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

AGENCY, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT ANNUAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS FOR
THE YEAR

1980, at 1 (1981) (Reporting 1980 CIA figures);

DEPARTMENT OF DE-

FENSE, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT PROGRAM CY 1979: SUMMARY OF THE REPORT TO CONGRESS 2 (1980) (reporting 1979 Defense Department figures);
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT ANNUAL REPORT

TO THE CONGRESS FOR THE YEAR

1979, at 1 (1980) (reporting 1979 CIA figures);

1978

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT REPORT OF THE

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE,

DEPARTMENT

figures);

OF

DEFENSE

2 (1979) (reporting 1978 Defense Department

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT ANNUAL

REPORT TO THE CONGRESS FOR THE YEAR

1978,

at

1 (1979)

(reporting

1978 CIA

figures); CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT: A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF EXECUTIVE BRANCH ANNUAL

REPORTS FOR

1977, at 29 (1978) (reporting 1977 figures for both agencies);

CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE FREEDOM OF
INFORMATION ACT: A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF EXECUTIVE BRANCH ANNUAL REPORTS

FOR 1976, at 26 (1977) (reporting 1976 figures for both agencies); CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT:

A

BRIEF OVERVIEW OF EXECUTIVE BRANCH ANNUAL REPORTS FOR

1975,

at 26 (1976) (reporting 1975 figures for both agencies). Editor's Note: Copies of
the reports cited in this footnote are on file with the author.
The number of FOIA requests actually denied is somewhat less than this
figure of 8799 because the agencies grant some requests after the requestor appeals the initial denial. However, the annual reports do not indicate the basis
for the initial denials from which these granted appeals were appealed. See, e.g.,
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the agency asserted was properly classified. 4 4
Recognizing that the judiciary is not engaging in any meaningful review of classification decisions challenged in (b)(1) suits
and assuming that the situation that existed prior to enactment of
the 1974 FOIA amendments was unsatisfactory, we face the challenge of developing some effective oversight process. The first
step towards a solution is to understand why the judiciary has behaved as it has.
II.
A.

EXPLAINING JUDICIAL DEFERENCE

Legislative History: The Heat and the Smoke

The judiciary has assigned itself an extremely narrow role in
FOIA litigation. According to the courts, the legislative history of
the 1974 amendments 4 5 to the Freedom of Information Act mandates such a role. 4 6 However, a review of that legislative history
47
reveals that such an assertion is indefensible.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT PROGRAM CY 1984:
SUMMARY OF THE REPORT TO CONGRESS 8 (1985) (reporting that Defense Depart-

ment granted 77 appeals but not indicating basis for initial denials of those appeals; the 77 granted appeals represent less than two percent of the 6619 FOIA
requests that Defense Department initially denied).
44. There is but one (b)(1) case in which a court of appeals has ordered
disclosure of a document. See Holy Spirit Ass'n v. CIA, 636 F.2d 838 (D.C. Cir.
1981), vacated, 455 U.S. 997 (1982). In that case the Supreme Court granted
certiorari, and the respondent Unification Church withdrew its FOIA request.
See Holy Spirit Ass'n v. CIA, 455 U.S. 997 (1982) (vacating the District of Columbia Circuit's decision upon request by respondent). The church withdrew its
request because it feared an adverse decision in the Supreme Court. Interview
with Alan Adler, ACLU National Security Project (June 5, 1985).
45. Pub. L. No. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561-64 (1974) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552
(1982)).
46. See Abbotts v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 766 F.2d 604, 606 (D.C.
Cir. 1985) (citing and quoting S. REP. No. 1200, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1974));
Miller v. Casey, 730 F.2d 773, 776 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (citing S. REP. No. 1200, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1974)); Diamond v. FBI, 707 F.2d 75, 79 (2d Cir. 1983)
(citing S. REP. No. 1200, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1974)), cert. denied, 465 U.S.
1004 (1984); Salisbury v. United States, 690 F.2d 966, 970 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (citing and quoting S. REP. No. 1200, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1974)); Stein v. Department ofJustice & FBI, 662 F.2d 1245, 1253 (7th Cir. 1981) (same), Military
Audit Project v. Casey, 656 F.2d 724, 738 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (citing S. REP. No.
1200, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1974)); Baez v. Department of justice, 647 F.2d
1328, 1335 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (same); Hayden v. National Security Agency, 608
F.2d 1381, 1386 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (same), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 937 (1980); Terkel
v. Kelly, 599 F.2d 214, 217 n.3 (7th Cir. 1979) (quoting and citing S. REP. No.
1200, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1974)), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1013 (1980); Ray v.
Turner, 587 F.2d 1187, 1192-94 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (same).
47. The fact that the courts have attempted to resolve these FOIA controversies by resort to legislative history is itself an indictment of the case law in this
area, for it is quite clear that judicial interpretation of legislative history is an
indeterminate process. See, e.g., Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV.
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In 1973 the Supreme Court decided Mink v. Environmental
ProtectionAgency, 48 a seminal case in the devolution of government
information policy. The dispute in Mink arose after a newspaper
reported that President Nixon had received conflicting recommendations from a special committee formed to consider the advisability of conducting an underground nuclear test scheduled to
take place at Amchitka Island, Alaska, in the fall of 1971. Congresswoman Patsy Mink requested that the President release the
recommendations and the report upon which they were based,
but the White House refused to do so. She then submitted a
FOIA request. When the executive branch denied this request,
she and thirty-two of her congressional colleagues filed suit in district court.
The executive branch immediately moved for summary judgment, contending that the documents at issue were exempted
from the Act's disclosure requirements by sections (b)(1) and
(b)(5). 49 At that time (b)(1) simply exempted documents "specifically required by Executive order to be kept secret in the interest
of the national defense or foreign policy." 50 Relying exclusively
on an affidavit submitted by an undersecretary of the State Department who claimed that the documents at issue has been classified in accordance with Executive Order 10,501-the Executive
Order that controlled classification activity at that time-the dis51
trict court granted the motion for summary judgment.
The plaintiffs appealed to the D.C. Circuit. With respect to
exemption (b)(1) they argued that the executive branch could
only withhold those documents and portions of documents that
actually qualified for classification. Noting that many of the files
at issue contained documents that were classified not because
their disclosure posed any threat to national security but only because they had been incorporated into files that contained other
documents that were properly classified, the plaintiffs contended
that the district court should have reviewed all the requested material and segregated the classified from the unclassified, releas863 (1930). However, so long as the courts insist on relying on such interpretation to decide cases, it is legitimate for commentators to critique those cases by
showing how the proffered interpretations mischaracterize the very materials the
courts are citing.
48. 410 U.S. 73 (1973).
49. Id. at 75.
50. Pub. L. No. 90-23, 81 Stat. 54 (1967).
51. Id.at 77-78.
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ing the latter. 52 The court of appeals agreed. In a per curiam
opinion it reversed the district court and remanded the case with
instructions that the district court judge review all the requested
material, segregating and releasing those documents not classifia-

5
ble on their own. 3

The executive branch appealed to the Supreme Court, which
reversed the court of appeals and affirmed the district court's
grant of summary judgment. 54 Writing for the majority, Justice
White first noted that FOIA was "broadly conceived" and sought
"to permit access to official information long shielded unnecessarily from public view." 5 5 However, after reviewing what he took
to be the legislative history of section (b)(1), he construed the exemption as according the courts only a very limited role in FOIA
litigation:
What has been said thus far makes wholly untenable
any claim that the Act intended to subject the soundness
of executive security classification decisions to judicial
review at the insistence of any objecting citizen. It also
negates the proposition that Exemption 1 authorizes or
permits in camera inspection of a contested document
bearing a single classification so that the court may separate the secret from the supposedly nonsecret and order
56
disclosure of the latter.
The Court's holding, which eliminated judicial review of contested documents, and its reading of section (b)(1)'s legislative
history provoked an immediate response from Congress; in 1974
it voted to amend the Act with the express intention of overruling
Mink. The conference report 5 7 explicitly confirms this:
H.R. 12471 amends the present law to permit such
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. at 78.
See id. at 84.
Id. at 92-94.
Id. at 80.
Id. at 84.
H.R. REP. No. 1380, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 9-12 (1974), reprinted in STAFFS

OF HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS AND SENATE
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 94TH CONG., IST SESS., FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
AND AMENDMENTS OF 1974 (P.L. 98-502), SOURCE BOOK: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
TEXTS, AND OTHER DOCUMENTS 226 (Joint Comm. Print 1975). See also 120

34,166 (1974) (statement of Rep. Moorhead) ("What we are trying
to overrule is the situation described in the famous Mink case, where the Court
said to the Congress, no matter how frivolous or capricious the classification
should be, that the Court could not go behind it.").
CONG. REC.
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493

in camera examination at the discretion of the court.
While in camera examination will not be automatic, in
many situations it will plainly be necessary and appropriate. Before the court orders in camera inspection, the
Government should be given the opportunity to establish by means of testimony or detailed affidavits that the
documents are clearly exempt from disclosure. The burden remains on the Government under this law.
When linked with the authority conferred upon the
Federal courts in this conference substitute for in camera
examination of contested records as part of their de novo
determination in Freedom of Information cases, [the
language of the conference version of § 552(b)(1)] clarifies Congressional intent to override the Supreme
Court's holding in the case of E.P.A. v. Mink, et al., supra,
with respect to in camera view of classified documents.
However, the conferees recognize that the Executive departments responsible for national defense and
foreign policy matters have unique insights into what adverse affects [sic] might occur as a result of disclosure of
a particular classified record. Accordingly, the conferees
expect that Federal Courts, in making de novo determination in section 552(b)(1) cases ... will accord substantial
weight to an agency's affidavit concerning the details of
58
the classified status of the disputed record.
Whatever ambiguity there may be in this language is dispelled by the Senate report:
The courts, in order to determine that the information actually is "covered" by the order of statute, will ordinarily be obliged by S. 2543 to inspect the material in
question and, from such an inspection, to determine
whether the classification was imposed by an official authorized to impose it and in accordance with the standards set forth in the applicable executive order.

58. H.R. REP. No. 1380, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 9-12 (1974), reprintedin STAFFS
OF HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS AND SENATE
COMM. ON THEJUDICIARY, 94TH CONG., 1ST SESS., FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
AND AMENDMENTS OF 1974 (P.L. 93-502), SOURCE BOOK: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
TEXTS, AND OTHER DOCUMENTS 225-29 (Joint Comm. Print 1975).
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The committee realizes that such an examination of
sensitive, and quite probably, complex material may impose an additional burden on judges. And the committee would expect judges, in such circumstances, to give
consideration to any classification review of the material
being sought already conducted within the executive
branch....
It is essential, however, to the proper workings of
the Freedom of Information Act that any executive
branch review, itself, be reviewable outside the executive
branch. And the courts-when necessary, using special
masters or expert consultants of their own choosing to
help in such sophisticated determinations-are the only
forums now available in which such review can properly
be conducted.
The judgments involved may often be delicate and
difficult ones, but someone other than interested parties-officials with power to classify and conceal information-must be empowered to make them. It is the
committee's conclusion that the courts are qualified to
59
make such judgments.
The relevant language in the House report states that "jt]he
in camera provision is permissive and not mandatory. It is the intent of the committee that each court be free to employ whatever
means it finds necessary to discharge its responsibilities. ' ' 60
59. S. REP. No. 854, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 30-31 (1974), reprintedin STAFFS OF
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS AND SENATE
COMM. ON THEJUDICIARY, 94TH CONG., lST SESS., FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
AND AMENDMENTS OF 1974 (P.L. 98-502), SOURCE BOOK: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
TEXTS, AND OTHER DOCUMENTS 182-83 (Joint Comm. Print 1975).

60. H.R. REP. No. 876, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in STAFFS OF
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS AND SENATE
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 94TH CONG., lST SESS., FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
AND AMENDMENTS OF 1974 (P.L. 98-502), SOURCE BOOK: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
TEXTS, AND OTHER DOCUMENTS 128 (Joint Comm. Print 1975).
The floor debate on the amendment is consistent with the formal history
discussed above. The House debate on the amendments came on March 14,
1974. Representative William Moorhead (D-Pa.), chairman of the Foreign Operations and Government Information Subcommittee and author of H.R. 5425,
one of two bills that were combined to form H.R. 12471-the final amendments-declared, "I do not think we have to make dummies out of [district court
judges] by insisting they accept without question an affidavit from some bureaucrat-anxious to protect his decisions whether they be good or bad-that a particular document was properly classified and should remain secret." 120 CONG.
REC. 6811-12 (1974). Representative John Erlenborn (R-Ill.), the ranking minority member of the subcommittee that reported the amendments, stated, "It is
clearly the intention of the committee to make these documents subject to in-
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Notwithstanding the fact that both houses approved the con6
ference version of the amending legislation nearly unanimously, '
President Ford vetoed it.62 He objected principally to the judicial-review provisions, protesting that "the courts should not be
forced to make what amounts to the initial classification decision
in sensitive and complex areas where they have no particular expertise." 6 3 However, both the Senate and the House voted to
override the veto, 6 4 and the amendments became law.
This legislative history, the courts argue, compels judges to
examine documents only as a "last resort" and to grant nearly
preclusive effect to self-serving, executive-branch affidavits. To
be charitable, such an argument is unpersuasive. While the language at issue is not without ambiguity, it certainly indicates that
spection in camera and in chambers, not in public, by the judge, who can then
decide as to whether the classification is proper under the Executive order authorizing such classification." Id. at 6808. For the complete House debate, see
120 CONG. REc. 6804-20 (1974).
The Senate debated its version of the amendments on May 31, 1974. Senator Edmund Muskie (D-Me.), who introduced the original FOIA-amending legislation in the Senate, said, "I cannot understand why we should trust a Federal
judge to be able to sort out valid from invalid claims of Executive privilege in the
Watergate affair but not trust him or his colleagues to make the same unfettered
judgments in matters allegedly connected to the conduct of defense or foreign
policy." 120 CONG. REC. 17,023 (1974). Senator Lawton Chiles (D-Fla.) argued,
"We say that four-star generals or admirals will be reasonable but a Federal
district judge is going to be unreasonable. I cannot buy that argument, especially when I see that general or that admiral has participated in covering up a
mistake, and the Federal judge sits there without a bias one way or another." Id.
at 17,028. For the complete Senate floor debate, see 120 CONG. REC. 17,014-31
(1974).
61. The House approved the conference version of the amendments by a
vote of 349 to 2. See 120 CONG. REC. 34,168 (1974). The Senate adopted the
report without opposition. See 120 CONG. REC. 33,300 (1974).
62. See President's Message to the House of Representatives Returning
H.R. 12471 Without His Approval, 10 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1318-19 (Oct.
17, 1974).
63. Id. at 1319. In his message to Congress, the President stated:
As the legislation now stands, a determination by the Secretary of
Defense that disclosure of a document would endanger our national
security would, even though reasonable, have to be overturned by a
district judge who thought the plaintiff's position just as reasonable
I propose, therefore, that where classified documents are requested, the courts could review the classification, but would have to
uphold the classification if there is a reasonable basis to support it. In
determining the reasonableness of the classification, the courts would
consider all attendant evidence prior to resorting to an in camera examination of the document.
Id.
64. The House voted to override the veto on November 20, 1974, by a vote
of 371 to 31. See 120 CONG. REc. 36,633 (1974). The Senate vote came on the
next day, the margin being 65 to 27. See id. at 36,882.
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Congress intended that the courts play a far more active role in
65
(b)(1) cases than the one they have chosen.
B.

The Reality of (b)(1) Litigation: The Light

We can far better understand the judicial approach to national security FOIA cases by thinking for a moment of the position in which a judge presiding over one of these cases finds
herself. She receives a complaint filed by the attorney of, for example, an inquisitive journalist who seeks disclosure of all files
maintained by the Central Intelligence Agency that concern an
alleged covert operation. She then receives from an attorney representing the CIA a response alleging that the documents cannot
be released-or, in many cases, cannot even be acknowledged to
exist-because to do so would threaten the national security. The
CIA affidavit may speak menacingly of the necessity of protecting
"the production of covert nondomestic use of technological intelligence gathering devices" 66 or the importance of preventing the
Soviet Union from knowing "whether or not there exists an
Army-wide vulnerability capable of exploitation." 6 7 In many
cases, because the affidavit itself is a classified document, the
judge's law clerks must first receive security clearances before
they can even read it.68
65. In Ray v. Turner, Judge Skelly Wright, concurring only in the judgment,
offered the most extensive judicial review of the legislative history to date. 587
F.2d 1187, 1206-14 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (Wright, J., concurring). Judge Wright arrived at a conclusion different than that of the majority as to the appropriate role
of the courts in (b)(1) cases. Id. at 1213. With respect to the language in the
Senate version of the conference report that the majority-and courts in many
decisions since-relied upon to conclude that substantial deference was due
agency affidavits, Judge Wright wrote:
Stretching the Conference Committee's recognition of the "substantial
weight" deserved by demonstrated expertise and knowledge into a
broad presumption favoring all agency affidavits in national security
cases would contradict the clear provisions of the statute and would
render meaningless Congress' obvious intent in passing these provisions over the President's specific objections.
Id.
66. Military Audit Project v. Casey, 656 F.2d 724, 739 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (affidavit of ErnestJ. Zellmer, Associate Deputy Director, Directorate of Science and
Technology of the Central Intelligence Agency).
67. Taylor v. Department of the Army, 684 F.2d 99, 108 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
(affidavit of General Edmund R. Thompson).
68. See, e.g., Letter from D. Jerry Rubin, Department Security Officer,
United States Department ofJustice, to Pamela Marks, Law Clerk to Honorable
Joseph H. Young, United States District CourtJudge, Baltimore, Maryland (Dec.
11, 1985) (granting security clearance to read classified documents produced in
1985 espionage trial of Samuel Morrison); Letter from D. Jerry Rubin, Department Security Officer, United States Department of Justice, to Lauren Dame,
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Faced with such a situation, it is entirely understandableeven predictable-that the judge will be extremely cautious in her
handling of the plaintiff's request for disclosure. Given the aura
that surrounds the intelligence community and the classification
process, it is easy to see why ajudge would be extremely reluctant
to question the merits of the classification-why she would shun
in camera inspection of the documents and rely heavily upon
agency affidavits.
While this proposed explanation of the judiciary's hyper-deferential posture is premised partially on the reasoning that, because the courts so clearly have distorted the legislative history,
something else must be afoot, the courts have also made several
conspicuous references to their perception that they lack the expertise necessary to pass judgment on classification decisions. In
Halperin v. CIA, 6 9 for instance, the D.C. Circuit warned that
"[j]udges, moreover, lack the expertise necessary to second-guess
'70
...agency decisions in the typical national security FOIA case."
The court proffered a similar admonition in Weissman v. CIA: 7 t
"Few judges have the skill or expertise to weigh the repercussions
of disclosure of intelligence information." 72 In Klaus v. Blake, 7 3 a
case decided by a district court within the D.C. Circuit shortly after enactment of the 1974 amendments, the court wrote,
"[d]eterminations of what is and what is not protected in the interests of national security involves an analysis where intuition
must often control in the absence of hard evidence. This intuition develops from experience quite unlike that of most
Law Clerk To Honorable Herbert F. Murray, United States District CourtJudge,
Baltimore, Maryland (granting her security clearance to read classified documents produced in 1986 espionage trail of Ronald Pelton).
69. 629 F.2d 144 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
70. Id. at 148. Halperin involved a request for access to all fee agreements
and correspondence between the CIA and any attorneys retained by the CIA
during an eight-year period. Id. at 146. The agency released documents pertaining to legal services rendered on an unclassified basis, but claimed an exemption for all documents relating to legal services connected with covert or
classified operations. Id. The district court granted the agency summary judgment on the basis of agency affidavits. Id.
The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the district court had acted
properly within the "limited standard for de novo review" in national security
FOIA cases. Id. at 148. The court noted that the expert opinions contained in
agency affidavits were to be afforded "substantial weight" in determining the
propriety of the agency's claim to a national security exemption. Id. at 147-48.
71. 565 F.2d 692 (D.C. Cir. 1977). For a discussion of Weissman, see supra
notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
72. 565 F.2d at 697.
73. 428 F. Supp. 37 (D.D.C. 1976).
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Judges.", 74
III.

DEMYSTIFYING CLASSIFICATION

From what has been said so far, two considerations emerge
that illuminate the dilemma confronting those interested in assuring that the executive branch properly handle FOIA requests for
sensitive information. On the one hand, because the executive
branch apparently is incapable of responsibly exercising the
power to classify, some external review of classification decisions
contested in (b)(1) cases is needed. On the other hand, efforts to
mandate that review-enactment of the 1974 FOIA amendments-have been rebuffed by the judiciary in the belief that
judges are not qualified to question classification decisions made
by executive-branch officials.
If we believe that the documented classification abuse counsels independent review of the classification decisions that the executive branch is using to deny FOIA requests, and if the
judiciary's perception about its inability to review classification
decisions is correct, and assuming Congress declines to assume
the responsibility of classification oversight, we appear to have an
intractable problem. However, there is a solution, and the key to
that solution lies in the realization that the judiciary's perception
of its inability to review classification decisions is false.
Thejudiciary's assertion that it is without the requisite expertise to review the executive branch decisions contested in (b)(1)
cases necessarily assumes that those decisions require some expertise that judges lack but that persons making the decisions
possess. My contention that the judiciary's deferential posture in
(b) (1) cases is inappropriate is based on my belief that this critical
assumption is demonstrably false.
Intelligent assessment of the judiciary's assumption requires
some prefatory exploration. To decide whether classification decisions require some expertise that judges lack, we first must understand what it is that classification decisions require. And to
decide whether those who make classification decisions challenged in (b)(1) suits are bringing some expertise to those decisions to which judges should defer, we must identify those who
are making these decisions and see how they are making them.
74. Id. at 38.
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A.

What Classification Decisions Require: The Formal
Classification Calculus

With one narrow exception, 75 Congress has never authorized
the executive branch to classify documents. 76 Instead, presidential executive orders have provided the sole basis for the classification system, with Presidents relying on asserted inherent
constitutional powers as authority for classification. 7 7 President
Roosevelt's order "Defining Certain Vital Military and Naval Installations and Equipment," issued in 1940, was the first formal
executive order prescribing classification procedures and standards. 78 Since then Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, Nixon, and
Carter have modified the classification process through their own
79
executive orders.
In 1982 the Reagan administration issued Executive Order
12,356,80 the order that controls present classification activity.
Billing itself as "prescrib[ing] a uniform system for classifying,
declassifying, and safeguarding national security information,''8
the order, like its predecessors, sets out formal classification
criteria.
The order first states that no information can be classified
unless it falls into one of ten specified categories of classifiable
information. The categories are virtually exhaustive:
75. Congress included limited classification authority in its enactment of
the Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2168 (1982).
76. Congress has considered, but never enacted, legislation that would create a statutory classification system. See H.R. 12004, reprintedin Security Classification Reforms Hearings Before the Foreign Operations and Government Information
Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3-30
(1974).
77. See Exec. Order No. 12,356 preamble, 3 C.F.R. 166, 166 (1983) ("[B]y
the authority vested in me by the Constitution and laws of the United States of
America .. ");Garfinkel, Executive Coordinationand Oversight of Security Classification Administration, 1 GOV'T INFORMATION Q. 157, 158 (1984).
78. HOUSE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, EXECUTIVE CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION-SECURITY CLASSIFICATION PROBLEMS INVOLVING EXEMPTION (b)(1) OF THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (5 U.S.C. § 552), H.R. REP.

No. 93-221, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 4-14 (1973).
79. Exec. Order No. 11,652, 3 C.F.R. 678 (1972), reprinted in 50 U.S.C.
§ 401 (Supp. III 1973) (Nixon order); Exec. Order No. 12,065, 3 C.F.R. 190
(1979), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 401 (Supp. III 1979) (Carter order); Exec. Order
No. 10,501, 3 C.F.R. 979 (1953) (Eisenhower order); Exec. Order No. 10,290, 3
C.F.R. 789 (1951) (Truman order).
80. Exec. Order No. 12,356, 3 C.F.R. 166 (1983), reprinted in 50 U.S.C.
§ 401 (1982).

81. Exec. Order No. 12,356 preamble, 3 C.F.R. 166 (1983).
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Information shall be considered for classification if
it concerns:
(1) military plans, weapons, or operations;
(2) the vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, projects, or plans relating to the national
security;
(3) foreign government information;
(4) intelligence activities (including special activities) or intelligence sources or methods;
(5) foreign relations or foreign activities of the
United States;
(6) scientific, technological, or economic matters
relating to the national security;
(7) United States Government programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities;
(8) cryptology;
(9) a confidential source; or
(10) other categories of information that are related
to the national security and that require protection
against unauthorized disclosure . . . .82
If the information falls into one of these ten categories, the order
states that it may be classified if "its unauthorized disclosure,
either by itself or in the context of other information, reasonably
83
could be expected to cause damage to the national security."
Executive Order 12,356 thus identifies two criteria for the
classification of all government information. First, the information must be classifiable-that is, it must fall within one of the ten
categories of information listed in the order. So long as the infor82. Id. § 1.3(a), 3 C.F.R. 168-69.
83. Id. preamble, 3 C.F.R. 166. The Carter and Nixon orders specified similar standards. See Exec. Order No. 12,065 preamble, 3 C.F.R. 190 (1979), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 401 (Supp. III 1979) (authorizing classification "in order to
balance the public's interest in access to Government information with the interest to protect certain national security information from disclosure"); Exec. Order No. 11,652, § 1, 3 C.F.R. 375-76 (1973), reprintedin 50 U.S.C. § 401 (Supp.
III 1973) ("Official information or material which requires protection against
unauthorized disclosure in the interest of the national defense or foreign relations of the United States (hereinafter collectively termed 'national security')
shall be classified ....").
Executive Order 12,356 specifies three classification levels: "confidential,"
"secret," and "top secret." See Exec. Order No. 12,356, § 1.1(a), 3 C.F.R. 167
(1983). These levels are to be applied to information the unauthorized disclosure of which, respectively, would cause "damage," "serious damage," and "exceptionally grave damage" to the national security. Id. Authority to delegate
classification authority depends upon the classification level of the document.

Id. § 1.2(d), 3 C.F.R. 167-68.
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mation is classifiable, it may be classified if its unauthorized disclosure would damage the national security.
B.

Who Classifies Documents: The Classification Process

1. Initial Classification
In addition to establishing formal classification criteria, Executive Order 12,356 prescribes guidelines for the procedures by
which information is to be classified. The executive branch employs two techniques for classifying information: "original classification" and "derivative classification."
An original classification decision is "an initial determination
by an authorized official that information requires protection
from unauthorized disclosure in the interest of national security."84 About 7,000 executive branch officials, most of whom are
agency heads or military officers of flag rank or higher, 8 5 have
original classification authority.8 6 Thus, as an example of original
classification, if a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff-an official
with original classification authority-commis'sions a report on
Air Force wartime preparedness, upon receipt of the report he
may classify it if it contains classifiable information and he believes that its disclosure would damage the national security.8 7
The original classification process corresponds closely to the
criteria outlined in Executive Order 12,356. An executive branch
84. INFORMATION SECURITY OVERSIGHT OFFICE, ANNUAL REPORT TO THE

PRESIDENT, FY 1984, at 5 (1985). See also Department of Defense Information
Security Program Regulation, 32 C.F.R. § 15 9 .12(y) (1984) (defining original
classification as "[a]n initial determination that information requires, in the interest of national security, protection against unauthorized disclosure, together
with a classification designation signifying the level of protection required").
Original classification authority is held by the president, agency heads, and any
person to which such authority is delegated by an agency head. Exec. Order No.
12,356, 3 C.F.R. 166, 167 (1983).
85. Telephone interview with Steven Garfinkel, Director, Information Security Oversight Office (Apr. 9, 1985).
86. See INFORMATION SECURITY OVERSIGHT OFFICE, ANNUAL REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT, FY 1985, at 8 (1986) (reporting that 7,014 individuals possessed
original classification authority).
87. According to Steven Garfinkel, Director of the Information Security
Oversight Office, the executive-branch office responsible for monitoring the
classification system, original classification is authorized only if four conditions
are met: (1) the classifier must have authority to make original classification decisions; (2) the information must be in the government's control; (3) the information must fall into one of the ten categories that the executive order specifies
as categories of classifiable information; and (4) the classifier must conclude that
disclosure of the information could damage the national security. Telephone
interview with Steven Garfinkel, Director, Information Security Oversight Office
(Apr. 9, 1985).
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official first considers whether the information is classifiable and
then decides whether its unauthorized disclosure would damage
national security. If the information is classifiable and its disclosure would damage the national security, the official will classify
the document that contains it.
Public perception of the classification system undoubtedly
rests on the assumption that most classification decisions are the
product of some process that resembles original classification.
However, this process in fact accounts for only about five percent
of classification activity. 88 Nearly all classification-approximately
ninety-five percent-is attributable to derivative classification.
Derivative classification is the process by which individuals
who lack original classification authority are able to classify information.8 9 The principal derivative classification technique entails
use of what is known as a classification guide. 90
A classification guide sets out general instructions for the
88. INFORMATION SECURITY OVERSIGHT OFFICE, ANNUAL REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT, FY 1985, at 12-13 (reporting figures indicating that derivative classification accounted for 96% of all classification activity in 1985); INFORMATION
SECURITY OVERSIGHT OFFICE, ANNUAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, FY 1984, at 11
(1985) (reporting that derivative classification accounted for 96% of classification activity in 1984 and that original classification accounted for only four percent); INFORMATION SECURITY OVERSIGHT OFFICE, ANNUAL REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT, FY 1983, at 12 (1984) (reporting that derivative classification accounted for 95% of all classification activity in 1983 and that original classifica-

tion accounted for only five percent);

INFORMATION

SECURITY OVERSIGHT

FY 1982, at 8 (1983) (reporting that
derivative classification accounted for 94% of all classification activity in 1982
and that original classification accounted for only six percent).
89. The executive branch defines derivative classification as "the act of incorporating, paraphrasing, restating or generating in one form classified source
information." INFORMATION SECURITY OVERSIGHT OFFICE, ANNUAL REPORT TO
THE PRESIDENT, FY 1984, at 9 (1985). See also Department of Defense Information Security Program Regulation, 32 C.F.R. § 159.12(n) (1984) (defining derivative classification as "a determination that information is in substance the same
as information currently classified, and the application of the classification markings"). However, this is misleading in that most derivative classification activity
is far less mechanical than the definition suggests. See infra text accompanying
notes 89-96.
90. A document also may be derivatively classified if it contains information
taken from a previously classified document. In such a case the portion of the
derivative document that contains the previously classified information must be
classified at the same level as the portion of the original document from which
the information was derived. See Exec. Order No. 12,356, § 2.1, 3 C.F.R. 166,
171 (1983), reprintedin 50 U.S.C. § 401 (1982); Department of Defense Information Security Program Regulation, 32 C.F.R. § 159.21 (m) (1984). The executive
order provides that "[p]ersons who apply derivative classification markings shall
observe and respect original classification decisions ... and ... carry forward to
any newly created documents any assigned authorized markings." Exec. Order
No. 12,356, § 21, 3 C.F.R. 166, 171 (1983).
OFFICE, ANNUAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT,
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classification of specific information. 9 ' It contains premade decisions about the classification of information. For example, if a
defense contractor engineer-someone who does not have original classification authority-completes a report describing the
specifications of a laser-guided weapon and wishes to classify it,
she would consult the classification guide issued pursuant to Department of Defense Directive 5210.62, "Laser Guidance Systems, Security Classification."-9 2 This guide 93 lists the specific
classification levels to be applied to various types of information
bearing on laser-guided weapons. 9 4 For instance, the guide directs that "type, performance details, [and] unique design information" about system testing "counter countermeasures" be
95
classified.
Although those using classification guides to classify information assess neither the classifiability of the information at issue
nor the consequences of its unauthorized disclosure, derivative
classification decisions are not divorced from the formal classification criteria of Executive Order 12,356. Rather, the idea is that
these assessments are incorporated into the classification guides,
which must be authored by officials with original classification authority. 9 6 So, when someone without such authority uses a guide
to classify a document, that person-in theory at least-simply
applies to a particular document a classification decision that was
made in accordance with the criteria of Executive Order 12,356.
2.

Administrative Review
Once a document is classified, the government agency that

91. See Department of Defense Information Security Program Regulation,
32 C.F.R. § 159.23(a) (1984). The Defense Department defines a classification
guide as a "document issued by an authorized original classifier that prescribes
the level of classification . . .for information to be classified derivatively." Id.
§ 159.12(d).
92. See Department of Defense, Department of Defense Instruction
5210.62, Laser Guidance Systems, Security Classification (Dec. 3, 1982).
93. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, SECURITY CLASSIFICATION GUIDE, PAVEWAY I,
LASER GUIDED WEAPONS, GBU-10/B, GBU-10/B, GBU-1OB/B, GBU-11/B,
GBU-I IA/B, GBU-12A/B, AND ASSOCIATED SUPPORT EQUIPMENT; PAVEWAY II,
LASER GUIDED WEAPONS, GBU- 1OC/B, GBU- 1OD/B, GBU- IOE/B, GBU- 12B/B,
GBU-12C/B, GBU-12D/B, GBU-16/B, GBU-16A/B, AND ASSOCIATED SUPPORT
EQUIPMENT (Mar. 1981).
94. Id. § B(2).
95. See id. at 9. Garfinkel explains that contractor employees are required
to classify documents according to the guide instructions and have no discretion
in the decision. Telephone interview with Steven Garfinkel, Director, Information Security Oversight Office (Apr. 18, 1985).
96. Exec. Order No. 12,356, § 2.2(b), 3 C.F.R. 166, 171 (1983).
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controls it can deny a request for its release by virtue of the Freedom of Information Act's national security exemption-section
(b)(1).. Yet the above review of the process by which documents
are initially classified neither describes fully the process producing the decisions that FOIA plaintiffs are contesting in (b)(1) suits
nor identifies the individuals whose decisions are the subject of
these suits, for before initial classification decisions reach the
courts they undergo administrative review within the executive
branch.
Administrative review of rejected requests for classified material is a simple process. If the government agency that controls a
classified document rejects a FOIA request for its release, the requestor may appeal that rejection to an "appellate authority." An
appellate authority is a government official authorized to review a
contested document and to make final decisions about FOIA requests for its release. In most instances such an official makes a
de novo decision as to whether the information is classifiable and
whether, if so, its unauthorized disclosure would cause harm to
the national security. If the appellate authority concludes that the
document's classified status is appropriate, he will affirm the rejection of the request; if he concludes that the document need not
97
be classified, he can order it released to the requestor.
97. Although each agency has its own procedures for handling FOIA requests, all agency procedures resemble those set out in the text. Because the
Defense Department accounts for most classification activity, see, e.g., INFORMATION SECURITY OVERSIGHT OFFICE, ANNUAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, FY 1984,
at 11 (1985) (reporting that Defense Department accounted for 84.7% of all
classification activity in 1984), its procedures for processing appeals are representative. Illustrative of the procedures used by the Defense Department are
those employed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of
Staff (OSD/OJCS).
According to Bill McDonald, Director of the Office of Freedom of Information and Security Review (OFOISAR), the OSD/OJCS office responsible for
handling FOIA requests, when OFOISAR receives a request, it forwards it to the
department component it believes has or is likely to have the requested document. Should that document turn out to be classified, the component can deny
the request, and, in such a case, the component notifies OFOISAR of the denial,
and it in turn informs the requestor. If the requestor wishes to appeal, she files
the appeal with the OFOISAR, which in turn sends notice of the appeal back to
the component that initially denied the request, asking that it reconsider the
denial. The component again decides whether to release the requested document and then forwards the decision, along with the actual document in question, back to the OFOISAR. At this point the OFOISAR reviews the document,
determines whether it is properly classified, and makes an independent decision
whether it should be released. This decision goes to the Assistant Secretary of
Defense (Public Affairs), the designated appellate authority for OSD/OJCS
FOIA requests, who finalizes the decision. Telephone interview with William
McDonald, Director, Office of Freedom of Information and Security Review, Department of Defense (Apr. 18, 1985).
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Should the appellate authority affirm an initial denial of a
FOIA request, the requestor may then file a federal lawsuit. 9 8
The appellate authority is the last executive branch official to review a classification decision before it reaches a district court
judge.
IV.

JUDICIAL EXPERTISE TO REVIEW CLASSIFICATION DECISIONS

We thus see that, according to Executive Order 12,356, a
classification decision requires the consideration of two factors:
the classifiability of the information and the ramifications of its
unauthorized disclosure. If the information is classifiable and if
its unauthorized disclosure would damage the national security,
the order authorizes its classification.
Having specified the formal criteria relevant to classification
decisions, outlined the process by which classification decisions
are made, and identified those involved in that process, we can
now assess the pivotal assumption underlying the judiciary's deferential approach in (b)(1) cases: that the decisions contested in
those cases require expertise that judges lack and that those making the decisions possess. This assumption is valid only if review
of classification decisions requires an expertise that judges are
without and if those making the decisions challenged in (b)(1)
suits can lay claim to such an expertise. Should the judiciary's
Along with the OSD/OJCS, five other Department of Defense agenciesthe Army, Navy, Air Force, Defense Intelligence Agency, and National Security
Agency/Central Security Service-account for almost all the FOIA denials based
on exemption (b)(1). See DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
ACT PROGRAM, CY 1984: SUMMARY OF THE REPORT TO CONGRESS 2, 9 (1985)
(reporting statistics indicating that in 1984 those six agencies accounted for
96% of all initial denials based on exemption (b)(1) and 97% of all appellate
denials based on exemption (b)(1)). The five other Department of Defense
agencies handle FOIA requests for classified documents in a manner similar to
OSD/OJCS. Telephone interview with Steven Thompson, Deputy Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Air Force (Apr. 23, 1985) (explaining Air
Force procedures); Telephone interview with Judith Anderson, Management
Analyst, Records Management Office, Department of the Army (Apr. 23, 1985)
(describing Army procedures); Telephone interview with James Tate, Jr., Assistant General Counsel (Ethics), Department of the Navy (Apr. 25, 1985) (describing Navy procedures); Telephone interview with Robert Hardzog, Freedom of
Information Officer, Defense Intelligence Agency (Apr. 30, 1985) (describing
DIA procedures); Telephone interview with Carmen Shoaff, National Security
Agency (May 6, 1985) (describing NSA procedures).
98. See Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1982); Department of Defense Freedom of Information Act Program, 32 C.F.R.
§ 286.53(b)(2) (1984) (requestor may seek federal district court review where
head of Department of Defense component refuses to disclose requested information or fails to respond to request in timely manner as prescribed by FOIA).
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assumption prove to be invalid, the deference predicated upon it
is without support.
A.

Subject Matter Expertise and Classification

"Expertise" is generally recognized to be analytic skill based
on objective knowledge gleaned from specialized experience or
training. According that meaning to the word in the context of
classification review, evaluation of the judiciary's deference to executive branch expertise in (b)(1) suits requires us to consider
whether classification decisions require any objective knowledge
attributable to special training or experience and whether those
making the classification decisions that judges are called upon to
review possess such knowledge.
Taking the latter point first, it is clear that those making initial classification decisions have no expertise to which judges
should defer. As discussed above, nearly all classification decisions are made by individuals who have no original classification
authority but who classify documents derivatively using classification guides. Almost anyone working on a project, inside or
outside the government, for which a classification guide has been
issued may so classify information. 99 In 1981 the General Accounting Office (GAO) estimated that 332,000 defense contractor
employees were authorized to classify documents derivatively I0 0
and noted that "more than half of [these] employees had not received any formal in-house training on how to classify documents."''
This report also revealed that classification guides
were often issued by Defense Department officials who were not
authorized to issue guides,' 0 2 that the guides frequently were outdated, vague, or inconsistent, 0 3 and that defense contractor employees classified many documents without any formal guidance
whatsoever.' 0 4 In a separate report the GAO concluded that the
"use of classification guides weakens control over the classifica99. Telephone interview with Steven Garfinkel, Director, Information Security Oversight Office (Apr. 18, 1984); Telephone interview with Harold
Relyea, Specialist on American National Government, Congressional Research
Service (Apr. 17, 1985) (Relyea is the CRS security classification expert).
100. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF UNITED
STATES REPORT TO CONGRESS; DOD SHOULD GIVE BETrER GUIDANCE AND TRAINING TO CONTRACTORS WHO CLASSIFY NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION 22
(1981).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 4, 5.
103. Id. at 4, 6-8.
104. Id. at 4, 8-9.
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tion of national security information."10 5
In light of the realities of the derivative classification process,
initial classification decisions do not warrant any expertise-based
deference from the judiciary. However, this assertion does not
compel the conclusion that those who make decisions contested
in (b)(1) suits bring no objective-knowledge expertise to those decisions, for before initial classification decisions reach federal
judges they are reviewed by executive branch appellate authorities, and there are no indications that the appellate review process
suffers problems analogous to those that plague derivative classification. Further, all appellate authorities have original classification authority, suggesting that they may have some subject-matter
expertise that initial classifiers do not.
In the absence of evidence to the contrary, one must assume
that appellate authorities possess objective-knowledge expertise
that federal judges do not. Consequently, it cannot be said that
those reviewing classification decisions that federal plaintiffs contest in (b)(1) suits bring no expertise to that prior review. This
does not mean, however, that federal judges should defer to executive branch expertise, for there remains to be addressed the fundamental issue whether the review of classification decisions
requires any expertise, as that term has been defined above. If it
does not, the fact that appellate authorities may be experts would
be irrelevant.
Assessing the relevance of expertise to classification review
takes us back to Executive Order 12,356. As discussed, the order
specifies that information may be classified only if it is classifiable
and if its unauthorized disclosure would damage the national security. Thus to decide whether one need be an expert to make
classification decisions, we must ask whether expertise is required
to measure information against these two criteria.
Clearly, the decision whether information is classifiable does
not require any expertise that judges lack. Such a decision entails
nothing more than a determination that the information contained in the document does or does not fall into one of the ten
categories of classifiable information listed in the order, a task
further simplified by virtue of the exhaustive character of the
listed categories.
105.
STATES

GENERAL
REPORT

ACCOUNTING

TO

CONGRESS:

OFFICE, COMPTROLLER GENERAL
IMPROVED

EXECUTIVE

BRANCH

OF

UNITED

OVERSIGHT

NEEDED FOR THE GOVERNMENT'S NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION CLASSIFICATION PROGRAM 30 (Mar. 9, 1979).
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If the decision about the classifiability of information does
not require any expertise, there remains the possibility that expertise is needed to decide whether unauthorized disclosure of
the information would harm the national security. Implicit in
such a decision is a process in which the decisionmaker first must
predict the real world consequences of unauthorized disclosure
and then must calculate whether the predicted consequences
would damage the national security.
Looking at the second calculation first, any assessment of
whether projected events would threaten the national security is
at root a definitional exercise directed at identification of the "national security." To conclude that certain consequences would
damage the national security is simply to conclude that, from the
perspective of the decisionmaker, the abstract concept "national
security" corresponds to a concrete world in which those consequences do not exist. Understood as such, it is clear that this
facet of a classification decision does not lend itself to, indeed is
immune to, objective-knowledge expertise. This is so because the
concept of nationalsecurity is peculiarly subjective and political, and therefore any effort to identify the nationalsecurity must itself be subjective and
political. Accordingly, the decision whether the consequences of
unauthorized disclosure of information at issue in a (b)(1) suit
would damage the national security does not require any
expertise.
The outstanding variable in the classification calculus is the
estimation of the ramifications of the unauthorized disclosure of
information. This certainly requires expertise. For instance, to
determine whether unauthorized disclosure of a report about
fraud and waste in a program for development of alloys will aid
the Soviets in their ability to project the pace of American weapons developments, one presumably must have some specific
knowledge about matters such as the importance of alloys to
weapons development and the status of present Soviet knowledge
of the American alloy development program. Undoubtedly, the
average federal district court judge does not have the ability to
make such estimations.
This fact, however, does not justify the view that judges lack
the requisite expertise to conduct de novo review of classification
decisions. What it does support is the contention that judges
should defer to executive branch officials' assertions with respect
to this particularaspect of the classification decision. Indeed the
conference report accompanying the 1974 amendments to the
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Freedom of Information Act reveals that Congress endorsed exactly this type of deference when it amended the Act:
[T]he conferees recognize that the Executive departments responsible for national defense and foreign
policy have unique insights into what adverse affects [sic]
might occur as a result of public disclosure of a particular classified record. Accordingly, the conferees expect
that Federal Courts, in making de novo determinations in
section 552(b)(1) cases ... will accord substantial weight
to an agency's affidavit concerning the details of the classified status of the disputed record. 10 6
As suggested by this language, the federal courts can and
should defer to credible executive branch assertions about the
specific consequences of unauthorized disclosure of classified information. But it is at this point that expertise-based, judicial deference should cease, for the specific-consequences variable is the
only variable in the classification formula that lends itself to expertise-based calculation. Subsequent assessment of whether
those calculated consequences threaten the national security entails purely political calculations that a federal judge can make
independently.
Judges are as "expert" as executive branch officials to identify the national security, and thus there is no reason to why they
should defer to executive branch decisions on this critical point in
(b)(1) disputes.
B.

PoliticalExpertise and Classification

We thus see that the judiciary's lack of expertise, to the extent that "expertise" denotes subject-matter knowledge or experience, does not preclude judicial review of classification
decisions. Yet, contentions that the courts lack the expertise to
review classification decisions may be premised on a different
conception of expertise; they may be premised on the belief that
classification review requires an ability to make political assessments that judges lack. Specifically, the argument may be that
executive branch officials are so much more qualified than judges
106. H.R. REP. No. 1380, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) (emphasis added),
reprintedin STAFFS OF HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS AND SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 94TH CONG.,

OF INFORMATION ACT AND AMENDMENTS OF 1974 (P.L.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, TEXTS, AND OTHER DOCUMENTS

IST SESS., FREEDOM

98-502), SOURCE BOOK:
226 (Joint Comm. Print

1975).
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to make the political calculations that are integral to classification
decisions that judges therefore must defer to executive branch
10 7
classification decisions that are at issue in (b)(1) suits.
There is no reason to believe that judges, in having assumed
that they lack the expertise to review classification decisions, have
had in mind this conception of expertise, and, consequently, a
successful critique of the federal judiciary's deferential posture in
(b)(1) suits need not rebut this argument. However, anyone who,
as I do, believes that federal judges should actively review executive branch classification decisions must address this argument,
for I believe that the issue of who should have final say over the
political decisions upon which classification decisions are predicated lies at the heart of the classification review controversy.
Who should define the national security for purposes of disposing of FOIA requests? In the abstract the suggestion that
judges should defer to executive-branch, political decisions bearing on the national security is a sensible one. High-ranking, executive-branch officials, particularly the President and his
immediate appointees, are more direct products of the political
process and arguably are more attuned to national security concerns than are federal judges. However, the contention that the
executive branch should have the final say over the political decisions that result in the denial of public access to government documents attributes a degree of trustworthiness to the executive
branch that it has demonstrated it does not deserve. Whether
one looks to the spectacular instances in which the executive
branch has tried to conceal information from the American public-instances such as the Pentagon Papers episode or Watergate-or to less dramatic but more systematic efforts-habitual
overclassification, for example-one finds sufficient reason to be
skeptical of any arrangement that would delegate to the executive
branch unreviewable authority to dispose of FOIA requests. Indeed, congressional suspicion of the executive branch's use of the
classification stamp to bar public access to government documents was largely responsible for the 1974 FOIA amendments.
As the Senate report to the amendments explained:
It is essential.., to the proper workings of the Freedom of Information Act that any executive branch review, itself, be reviewable outside the executive branch.
107. President Ford advanced this argument in supporting his veto of the
1974 amendments to the FOIA. See 120 CONG. REC. 36,243-44 (1974) (veto
message of President Ford).
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are the only forums now available in

which such review can properly be conducted.
The judgments involved may often be delicate and
difficult ones, but someone other than interested parties-officials with power to classify and conceal informa08
tion-must be empowered to make them.
Yet, even if one believes the executive branch to be entirely
trustworthy, the contention that the judiciary should defer to
political decisions made by the President or other high-ranking,
executive-branch officials neither compels norjustifies the conclusion that federal judges should defer to the political decisions
challenged in (b)(1) cases. This is so because judicial review of
classification decisions would not in any way entail review of the
political decisions of such officials.
As discussed above, the executive-branch officials who last
review classification decisions before they reach federal court are
the appellate authorities. 10 9 Consequently, the Freedom of Information Act's command that district court judges determine de
novo whether the disputed documents "are in fact properly classified" requires judges to review only the political decisions made
by those appellate authorities. None of these authorities is a top,
executive-branch official.
The Department of Defense and Central Intelligence Agency
account for approximately ninety-seven percent of all classification activity. 1 10 Six agencies within the Defense Department account for nearly all of its final (b)(1) denials of FOIA requests,"I '
and eight officials serve as the designated appellate authorities of
these agencies: the Army's Deputy General Counsel for Military
and Civil Affairs," 12 the Air Force's Deputy Administrative Assis108. S. REP. No. 854, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in STAFFS OF
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS AND SENATE
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 94TH CONG., I ST SESS., FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT

AND AMENDMENTS OF 1974 (P.L. 98-502), SOURCE BOOK: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,

TEXTS, AND OTHER DOCUMENTS 182-83 (Joint Comm. Print 1975).
109. For a discussion of appellate authority review, see supra text accompa-

nying notes 97-98.
110. See supra note 5.
111. See DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT PROGRAM

FY 1984: SUMMARY OF THE REPORT TO CONGRESS 2 (1985) (reporting statistics
indicating that in 1984 Office of the Secretary of Defense/Office of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, Army, Navy, Air Force, Defense Intelligence Agency, and Na-

tional Security Agency accounted for 96% of all initial denials based on exemption (b)(l)); id. at 9 (reporting statistics indicating that in 1984 those six agencies
accounted for 97% of all appellate denials based on exemption (b)(1)).
112. Telephone interview with Paula Boggs, Assistant to General Counsel,

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1986

41

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 2 [1986], Art. 2

512

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 3 1: p. 471

tant to the Secretary of the Air Force, 1 3 the Navy's General
Counsel and Judge Advocate General,' 14 the Office of the Secretary of Defense's Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, '5 two generals in the Defense Intelligence Agency, 1 6 and
the National Security Agency's Deputy Director." 7 As for the
CIA, six officials serve as the appellate authorities: the Deputy
Director for Administration, the Deputy Director for Intelligence,
the Inspector General, the Deputy Director for Operations, the
Deputy Director for Science and Technology, a former Inspector
General, and a former Director for Operations.' 18
When a judge considers the propriety of a classification decision contested in a (b)(1) suit, she thus is not passing judgment
on a political decision made by a Ronald Reagan, a George Bush,
or a Casper Weinberger. Instead, she is evaluating the political
calculations of a Darrell Peck, the Army's Deputy General Counsel for Military and Civil Affairs, of a Steven Thompson, the Deputy Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Air Force, or
of a Harry Fitzwater, the Deputy Director for Administration of
the CIA. Whatever the merit of the argument that the judiciary
should defer to political judgments rendered by the President or
Department of the Army (Apr. 25, 1985) (identifying Darrell Peck, Deputy General Counsel for Military and Civil Affairs, as Army's designated appellate
authority).
113. Telephone interview with Steven Thompson, Deputy Administrative
Assistant to the Secretary of the Air Force (Apr. 23, 1985) (identifying himself as
Air Force's designated appellate authority).
114. Telephone interview with James Tate, Jr., Assistant General Counsel
(Ethics), Department of the Navy (Apr. 25, 1985) (identifying Walter Skallerup,
Jr., General Counsel, Department of the Navy, as Navy's designated appellate
authority).
115. Telephone interview with Colonel Charlie Talbott, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (May 7, 1985) (identifying Michael
Burch, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs as the OSD/OCJS's des-

ignated appellate authority); see also DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE,
FORMATION ACT PROGRAM, CY 1984: SUMMARY OF THE REPORT

FREEDOM OF INTO CONGRESS

12

(1985).
116. Telephone interview with Robert Hardzog, Freedom of Information
Officer, Defense Intelligence Agency (Apr. 30, 1985) (identifying Major General
Schuyler Bissell and Lieutenant General James Williams as DIA's designated appellate authorities); see also DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
ACT PROGRAM, CY 1984: SUMMARY OF THE REPORT TO CONGRESS 12 (1985).
117. Telephone interview with Carmen Shoaff, National Security Agency
(May 6, 1985) (identifying Robert Rich, Deputy Director, as the NSA's designated appellate authority); see also DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT PROGRAM, CY 1984: SUMMARY OF THE REPORT TO CONGRESS 12
(1985).
118. Letter to author from G.L. Lamborn, Public Affairs Officer, Central
Intelligence Agency (Dec. 30, 1985).
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other high-ranking, executive-branch officials," 9 that argument
does not warrant judicial deference to the political assessments
0
implicit in the classification decisions challenged in (b) (1) suits. 12
V.

JURISPRUDENTIAL CONSIDERATIONS:

EXECUTIVE AUTONOMY

AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS

The realization that judges are qualified, in terms of expertise, to review executive-branch, classification decisions indicates
that the reasoning underlying the judiciary's present stance in
(b)(1) cases is faulty. However, this fact does not necessarily impeach the conclusion that the judiciary should not review these
decisions, for jurisprudential principles may militate against such
review.
The principal, possible jurisprudential impediment to active
judicial review of executive-branch, classification decisions flows
from the Constitution's tripartite division of the federal government. 1 2 ' Consistent with the constitutional scheme that accords
119. If a classification decision was in fact made by the President or the
head of an executive department, an additional obstacle to disclosure, "the state
secret privilege," would arise. For a discussion of the "state secret privilege,"
see infra note 130 and accompanying text.
120. Language in United States v. United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, 407 U.S. 297 (1972) (Keith), supports the conclusion
that judges are fully qualified to address national security issues. In holding that
the Constitution requires the FBI to obtain a judicial warrant before tapping an
individual telephone line, even if the FBI investigation implicated national security, the Court in Keith wrote:
We cannot accept the government's argument that internal security matters are too subtle and complex for judicial evaluation. Courts
regularly deal with the most difficult issues of our society. There is no
reason to believe that federal judges will be insensitive to or uncomprehending of the issues involved in domestic security cases. Certainly
courts can recognize that domestic security surveillance involves different considerations from the surveillance of "ordinary crime." If the
threat is too subtle or complex for our senior law enforcement officers
to convey its significance to a court, one may question whether there is
probable cause for surveillance.
Id. at 320.
121. A second consideration is whether the federal courts possess the constitutional power to review political decisions made by the executive branch in
the name of national security. As a general proposition, the United States Constitution empowers article III courts to review all legislative and executive
branch actions that are alleged to conflict with the Constitution. See United
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (upholding issuance of subpoena duces
tecum directing the President to produce "Watergate" tape recordings); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("It is, emphatically, the
province and duty of the judicial department, to say what the law is."). However, the Court has suggested that a narrow exception to this rule exists. The
thrust of this exception-embodied in the political-question doctrine-is that
the federal courts should decline to adjudicate certain rare disputes that the
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to each of the government's three branches-the judiciary, the
Constitution mandates to resolved by one of the other two branches of the federal government. The origins of the political-question doctrine can be traced to
Justice Marshall's opinion in Marbury v. Madison in which he suggested that
some discretionary actions by the President are not reviewable by the courts and
that the President "is accountable only to his country in his political character,
and to his own conscience" for these actions. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 166.
The Supreme Court outlined the contours of the modern political-question
doctrine in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). According to the Court in Baker,
whether a dispute involves a nonreviewable political question turns principally
on whether there is "a textually demonstrable commitment of the issue to a coordinate branch of government." Id. at 217. Justice Brennan, writing for the
Court, explained that "of course the mere fact that the suit seeks protection of a
political right does not mean it presents a political question." Id. at 209. In
explaining what would give rise to a political question, Justice Brennan noted,
[S]everal formulations . . . may describe a political question, although
each has one or more elements that describe it as essentially a function
of the separation of powers. Prominent on the surface of any case held
to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department,
or a lack ofjudicially discoverable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind
clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for
unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the
potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by
various departments on one question.
Unless one of these formulations is inextricable from the case at
bar, there should be no dismissal on the ground of a political question's
presence.
Id. at 217. Although Justice Brennan listed several attributes of political questions, only the "textually demonstrable commitment" is a constitutional limitation. See, e.g., Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 521 n.43 (1969) ("[T]he
force of respondents' other arguments that this case presents a political question
depends in great measure on the resolution of the textual commitment question." Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV.
1, 9 (1959) (in political question cases, "only proper judgment that may lead to
an abstention from decision is that the Constitution has committed the determination of the issue to another agency of the government than the courts").
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969), decided in 1969, is the most
important political question doctrine case to date. Powell arose out of efforts by
the House of Representatives to deny a seat to Adam Clayton Powell, who had
won election to the 90th Congress but who was alleged to have engaged in unethical and possibly illegal acts during his tenure as chairman of the House
Committee on Education and Labor during the 89th Congress. Id. at 489-90.
Powell filed suit seeking a court order that the House seat him. Id. at 493-94.
One argument advanced by the House was that the federal courts lacked the
power to resolve the dispute. Id. at 519-22.
In deciding whether the Constitution contains a textually demonstrable
commitment of authority that gives to the House the unreviewable power to
determine whether its prospective members were qualified to be seated, the
Court followed a two-step analysis. It first identified express language in the
Constitution that might indicate such a commitment, pointing to section five of
article I, which provides that "Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections,
Returns and Qualifications of its own Members." Id. at 519. The Court then
engaged in an extensive historical analysis of that language to determine if the
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executive, and the legislature-spheres of autonomy, the federal
courts have developed a separation-of-powers doctrine with
which they assess whether the actions of one branch impermissibly invade the domain of another.
Early Supreme Court cases spoke of a rigid separation of
powers, a system in which the three branches exercised exclusive
control over independent areas of responsibility. 122 However, in
Founding Fathers had indeed intended that the House have broad unreviewable
discretion to specify the qualifications of its members. Id. at 522-48. On behalf
of the Court, Chief Justice Warren concluded that the history behind the language did not support such broad judicial deference. Id. at 547.
Powell indicates that an issue is a political question beyond the power of the
federal courts only if there first exists express language in the Constitution indicating that resolution of the issue is committed to another branch. If such language exists, it is then necessary to interpret that language to determine whether
it in fact does constitute such a commitment. See id. at 521. The Court's other
political question doctrine cases have approached the issue in a similar fashion.
See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703 (1974) (dismissing President's contention that federal judiciary lacked constitutional power to review executive decision that certain documents were privileged, presumably on ground that no
language in Constitution even intimates that the executive should be sole arbiter
of constitutionality of the exercise of executive privilege); Gilligan v. Morgan,
413 U.S. 1, 12 (1973) (dismissing suit by former Kent State University students
seeking injunctive relief that would restrain National Guard's actions in future
cases of civil disorder, pointing to language in article I that grants Congress
oversight responsibility of state militia).
Application of this analysis to the issue of judicial review of classification
suggests that the political question doctrine does not bar such review, for the
Constitution contains no language that manifests a demonstrable commitment
of classification decisions to exclusive executive judgment. Article II provides
that "[t]he executive Power shall be vested in a President," U.S. CONST. art. II,
§ 1, cl. 1, that [tihe President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and
Navy," id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1, that "[h]e shall have Power, by and with the Advice
and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties," id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2, and that "he
shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed," id. art. II, § 3, cl. 4. One
might argue that any or all of these grants constitute a demonstrable commitment of classification authority to the executive. Yet, the stark contrast between
the indirect relation of these textual grants to classification and the direct applicability of the language discussed in Powell to the dispute in that case renders
this argument unpersuasive. To qualify as a demonstrable commitment the constitutional language must be far more explicit than is any of the language that is
arguably relevant to classification decisions. The political-question doctrine
presents no obstacle to judicial review of classification decisions.
122. In Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935), the
Court explained what was then the prevailing view of the separation of powers
doctrine:
The fundamental necessity of maintaining each of the three general departments of government entirely free from the control on coercive influence, direct or indirect, of either of the others, has often been
stressed and is hardly open to serious question. So much is implied in
the very fact of the separation of the powers of these departments by
the Constitution; and in the rule which recognizes their essential coequality. The sound application of a principle that makes one master in
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its modern cases the Court has rejected such an approach 2 3 and
has instead adopted a flexible one: "While the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates that
practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government. It enjoins upon its branches separateness but interde12 4
pendence, autonomy but reciprocity."'
FOIA (b)(1) exemption cases-in which Congress has ordered disclosure of documents that the executive branch claims
are classified and in which the judiciary conducts de novo review
of executive branch classification decisions-raise two discrete
separation of powers issues: (1) Does congressional legislation
compelling the executive to release to the public documents that
the executive believes will damage the national security violate
the separation of powers between Congress and the executive?
and (2) Does judicial review, pursuant to congressional direction,
of executive-branch, classification decisions violate the separation
of powers between the judiciary and the executive? Both of these
questions can be answered by asking whether national security
decisions are so important to the effective functioning of the executive branch that the separation-of-powers doctrine precludes action by either Congress or the judiciary that would overrule those
decisions.
The Supreme Court has never answered this question directly and, given the sparsity of separation-of-powers decisions
and the abstract character of those decisions, analogization to and
extrapolation from cases that address other separation-of-powers
questions are of limited use. However, the Court has twice stated
in dicta that it perceives no separation-of-powers obstacle to the
FOIA provisions that require the executive to release documents
it claims are classified and that require the judiciary to review executive classification decisions when deciding whether those documents should be released.
his own house precludes him from imposing his control in the house of
another who is master there.
Id. at 629-30 (1935).
123. See Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977)
(describing Humphrey's Executor approach as "archaic"); United States v. Nixon,
418 U.S. 683, 707 (1974).
124. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 122 (1976) (quoting Youngstown Sheet
& Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring));
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 707 (1974) (same). See also INS v. Chadha,
462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983) (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 121 (1976) for
proposition that "although not 'hermetically' sealed from one another, powers
delegated to the three Branches are identifiable").
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The first case in which the Court commented on the executive's constitutional independence to make national-security, classification decisions was EPA v. Mink,' 25 the case that Congress
overruled with the 1974 amendments to the Freedom of Information Act. As discussed above, the Court held in Mink that Congress, in its enactment of the original version of the Act, did not
intend for the courts to conduct in camera inspection of classified
documents that were contested in FOIA litigation.1 26 While the
case's disposition turned on statutory interpretation,1 2 7 with all
the Justices agreeing that the original statute did not direct judges
to second-guess classification decisions, 28 the Court stated that
"Congress could certainly have provided that the Executive
Branch adopt new procedures or it could have established its own
procedures-subject only to whatever limitations the Executive
privilege may be held to impose upon such Congressional ordering."' 129 As executive privilege, which is not at issue in (b)(1) litigation,1 30 is a concept entirely different from that of the
executive's constitutional autonomy, this language suggests that
the Court perceives no separation-of-powers problem here.
125. 410 U.S. 73 (1973).
126. Id. at 84. For a further discussion of Mink, see supra notes 48-56 and
accompanying text.
127. 410 U.S. at 94 (Stewart,J., concurring) ("This case presents no constitutional claims."). The majority determined that since exemption (b)(l) excluded documents that had been classified pursuant to an executive order, the
judiciary's inquiry was limited to whether such a classification had in fact been
made. Id. at 81-84.
128. Justice White, writing the majority opinion, stated that it was incorrect
to "claim that the Act intended to subject the soundness of executive classification decisions to judicial review at the insistence of any objecting citizen." Id. at
84. Justice Brennan, in a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Marshall, similarly
concluded that "[t]he District Court is not authorized to declassify or release
information that the Executive ...determines must be classified." Id. at 99
(Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas, in another dissenting opinion, concluded that "[t]he Court of Appeals never dreamed that a trial judge would declassify documents." Id. at 109 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist did
not participate in the decision. Id. at 94.
129. Id. at 83 (citing United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953)) (emphasis added).
130. The variant of executive privilege relevant to (b)(l) litigation is the socalled "state secret privilege." The courts consider the privilege only after there
is "a formal claim of privilege, lodged by the head of the department which has
control over the matter, and after actual personal consideration by that officer."
United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 7-8,(1953). See Kerr v. United States
District Court, 511 F.2d 192, 198 (9th Cir. 1075) (stating that the government
privilege must be formally asserted and delineated), aff'd, 426 U.S. 394 (1976).
Because none of these conditions are met in traditional (b)(1) cases, executive
privilege is not relevant.
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Nixon v. Administratorof General Services '3' is the second case in
which the Court directly broached the issue of executive autonomy with respect to FOIA. In that case the Court addressed the
constitutionality of a congressional statute that directed the General Services Administration to seize and to catalog documents
13 2
that former President Nixon claimed were his private papers.
The Court rejected Nixon's claim that the legislation impermissibly invaded the autonomy of the executive branch 33 and wrote:
[O]f course, there is abundant statutory precedent for
the regulation and mandatory disclosure of documents
in the possession of the Executive Branch. See, e.g., the
Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552.
Such regulation of material generated in the Executive
Branch has never been considered invalid as an invasion
of its autonomy. Cf. Environmental Protection Agency v.
34

Mink. 1

A final Supreme Court case relevant to executive autonomy
in the national security context is the Pentagon Papers Case,' 35 a
case in which the Court denied the federal government's petition
for an injunction that would have prohibited the New York Times
and Washington Post from publishing documents that the government claimed were classified.' 36 Although the case turned on the
constitutionality of a judicially imposed prior restraint, several of
the Justices, in separate opinions, 3 7 discussed the propriety of
judicial review of executive-branch, classification decisions. Im131. 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
132. Id. at 441-46. At issue in General Services was the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act of 1974, legislation intended to ensure governmental custody of documents and tape recordings accumulated during the
tenure of former President Nixon. Id. at 432-33. The law directed the Administrator of General Services, an executive official, to take custody of the Nixon
materials and to promulgate regulations for their screening by archivists for the
purpose of returning to Nixon those that were personal in nature. Id. at 433-36.
The Administrator was also directed to prepare regulations governing public
access to the materials that were to remain in the custody of the government. Id.
at 434-36. The day after the Act was signed into law Nixon filed an action in
district court challenging the Act's constitutionality on the grounds that on its
face it violated (1) the principle of separation of powers; (2) Presidential privilege; (3) Nixon's privacy interests; (4) his first amendment associational rights;
and (5) the bill of attainder clause. Id. at 439, 455-84.
133. Id. at 439-55.
134. Id. at 445 (citations omitted).
135. New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
136. Id. at 714.
137. The Court filed a per curiam opinion to which were attached five concurring opinions and three dissenting opinions.
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plicit in all of these views was the belief that the Constitution permits such review.
Justice Stewart, in a concurring opinion joined by Justice
White, argued that the Constitution assigned to the executive
power over and responsibility for "national defense and international relations," suggesting that Congress and the judiciary had
limited roles in these matters.1 3 8 But he then asserted that "if
Congress should pass a specific law authorizing civil proceedings
in this field, the courts would . . .have the duty to decide the
constitutionality of such a law as well as its applicability to the
facts proved." 1 39 AndJustice Stewart personally reviewed the allegedly classified documents, concluding, "I cannot say that disclosure of any of them will surely result in direct, immediate, and
1 40
irreparable damage to our Nation or its people."
Justice Harlan, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Blackmun, dissented from the per curiam opinion, but his opinion also rejected any suggestion that review of executive-branch,
classification decisions was beyond the ambit of judicial review.
After concluding that judicial power to review "activities of the
Executive Branch of government in the field of foreign affairs is
very narrowly restricted," 1 41 Justice Harlan seemed to draw a
clear line circumscribing judicial review, stating that "the judiciary may not properly ... redetermine for itself the probable impact of disclosure on the national security."' 4 2 However, he
immediately recanted: "Even if there is some room for the judiciary to override the Executive determination, it is plain that the
43
scope of review must be exceedingly narrow."'
Therefore it seems that Supreme Court case law provides little support for the proposition that the separation-of-powers doctrine shields executive-branch, classification decisions from
congressional reversal or congressionally directed judicial review.
138. 403 U.S. at 727 (Stewart, J., concurring).
139. Id. at 730 (Stewart, J., concurring).
140. Id.
141. Id. at 756 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
142. Id. at 757 (Harlan, J., dissenting). However, Justice Harlan did state
that the judiciary does have a role in evaluating the effects of disclosure of sensitive information. Id. In Justice Harlan's view the duty of the judiciary in this
area was to "review the initial Executive determination to the point of satisfying
itself that the subject matter of the dispute does lie within the proper compass of
the President's foreign relations power." Id. He then concluded that "Constitutional considerations forbid a 'complete abandonment ofjudicial control.'" Id.
(quoting United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 8 (1953)).
143. 403 U.S. at 758 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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This reading is supported by two important cases decided by the
D.C. Circuit-the circuit that has decided the important (b)(1)
cases-in which the executive argued that the Constitution protects its decisions to classify information from intrusion by other
branches.
The first case, Holy Spirit Association v. CIA, 14 4 decided in
1980, arose out of a FOIA request filed by the Unification
Church, which sought various CIA documents relating to the
church and its members. When the CIA refused to release many
of the documents, the church filed suit, and the district court ordered the agency to release segments of nine of the contested
documents.145 The government appealed.
In its appellate brief to the D.C. Circuit, the Justice Department stated that the district court's order compelling the CIA to
disclose the documents implicated "significant constitutional considerations."' 46 It went on to argue that extreme judicial deference to the agency's determination that the documents should
not be released was appropriate because "[t]he Supreme Court
and this Court have recognized the constitutional responsibility
and authority of the President in the realm of foreign policy and
national defense, as well as the lack of judicial expertise of the
judiciary in such matters."' 4 7 The court of appeals affirmed the
lower court order without even mentioning the separation-of48
powers issue.'
The other important D.C. Circuit case is United States v.
AT&T, 149 a case that did not involve a FOIA request but did
center on the release of documents the executive claimed were
classified. In AT&T the court of appeals expressly rejected the
government's contention that separation-of-powers principles insulate presidential, national-security decisions.150
The dispute in A T&T arose out of an effort by a House subcommittee to obtain telephone company records that detailed requests by the executive branch for warrantless wiretaps.' 5' The
144. 636 F.2d 838 (1980), vacated, 455 U.S. 997 (1982).
145. 636 F.2d at 839-40.
146. Cross-Appellant's Brief at 15, Holy Spirit Ass'n, 636 F.2d 838.
147. Id.
148. See 636 F.2d at 838-47.
149. 567 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
150. Id. at 123.
151. Id. at 122-23. In AT&T the House subcommittee was investigating
warrantless wiretapping conducted by the executive branch in the name of national security to determine whether legislation was required to curb possible
abuse of the practice. Id. at 123. As part of that investigation, the subcommittee
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Justice Department entered federal court and requested an injunction against the subcommittee's subpoena. The lower court
granted the injunction and the subcommittee appealed.' 5 2 On
appeal the Justice Department put the constitutional issue
squarely:
The United States contends that where .

.

. public

disclosure of extremely sensitive foreign intelligence and
counterintelligence documents ...

would gravely impair

the national defense and security and the foreign policy
of the United States, the President of the United States
has the ultimate responsibility for deciding whether the
risks of such disclosure .

.

. are acceptable. 153

However, the court of appeals rejected this position:
The Executive would have it that the Constitution
confers on the Executive absolute discretion in the area
of national security. This does not stand up. While the
Constitution assigns to the President a number of powers relating to national security ....

it confers upon Con-

gress other powers equally inseparable from the national
security ....

More significant, perhaps, is the fact that the Constitution is largely silent on the question of allocation of
powers associated with foreign affairs and national security. These powers have been viewed as falling within
a "zone of twilight" in which the President and Congress
share authority or in which its distribution is
uncertain. '54
issued a subpoena directing AT&T to produce records of all executive requests
for wiretaps. Id. The Justice Department sought to enjoin AT&T from complying with the subpoena, fearing that public disclosure of the documents would
damage national security. Id.
152. Id. at 124. This appeal followed an earlier one in which the D.C. Cir-

cuit did not attempt to resolve the dispute but rather remanded the case to the
district court with the suggestion that the parties attempt to negotiate a settle-

ment. See 551 F.2d 384, 395 (D.C. Cir. 1976). The court noted then that the
case involved "nerve-center constitutional questions" and suggested that the
parties explore a compromise settlement. Id. at 394. The renewed negotiation
did not resolve the dispute between the parties, and they reappealed. 567 F.2d
at 123.
153. Appellee's Brief at 23, AT&T, 567 F.2d 121.
154. 567 F.2d at 128. For another discussion of political question and separation-of-powers issues in FOIA litigation, see generally Note, National Security,
supra note 13.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1986

51

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 2 [1986], Art. 2

522

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31: p. 471

This language makes explicit what is implicit in the relevant
Supreme Court cases: the separation-of-powers doctrine does
not preclude judicial review of executive-branch, classification decisions. Thus, in light of the realization that federal judges are
perfectly capable of scrutinizing these decisions, there is no justification for the judiciary's abdication of its duty to review classification decisions in contested (b)(1) suits.
POSTSCRIPT

The realization that the federal judiciary is fully qualified to
review executive branch classification decisions contested in
(b)(1) suits, combined with the recognition that Congress, when it
enacted the 1974 amendments to the Freedom of Information
Act, intended that the courts scrutinize these decisions and the
conclusion that the Constitution neither bars such review nor requires unusual deference to executive-branch, classification decisions, would seem to remove all barriers to meaningful judicial
review in (b)(1) suits. However, such review will become a reality
only if either the judiciary or Congress acts decisively.
A decision by the judiciary to abandon its deferential posture
would, of course, be the most direct step towards assuring effective judicial review in (b)(1) suits. Alternatively, although it is difficult to conceive of a clearer mandate than that contained in the
1974 amendments, Congress could again act, reiterating its command that the courts actively review the classification decisions
contested by FOIA litigants. Unfortunately, for reasons unrelated
to the merits of judicial review in (b)(1) disputes, neither action
seems likely at this time.
Looking first to the judicial realm, in light of the courts of
appeals' repeated affirmances of their hands-off position and the
certainty of an appeal should they abandon this position, a judicial decision to commence active review in (b)(1) cases ultimately
must come from the Supreme Court. Yet, there is abundant reason to doubt that the present Court will take an activist approach
to the subject ofjudicial review of executive-branch, security-classification decisions. One can only hope that the recollection of
the unambiguous congressional response to EPA v. Mink-the
1973 case in which the Court interpreted FOIA to preclude active
judicial review in (b)(1) cases and the case that precipitated congressional enactment of the 1974 amendments-together with
the realization that judges are fully qualified to review contested
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classification decisions, will leave the Court no choice but to endorse an active judicial role in (b)(1) suits.
In the absence of a favorable Supreme Court decision, congressional action would be necessary. Yet, if the likelihood of a
judicial solution is slim, the likelihood of a legislative one is nonexistent. The recent rash of sensationalized "spy" arrests and trials, combined with the ideological orientation of those presently
controlling the Senate and White House, precludes at this time
legislation that would make more available to the public documents that the executive branch claims are sensitive.
The pessimism of this prognosis should not, however, be
construed as evidencing a retreat. It is essential that the executive
branch be stopped from exercising unilateral control over sensitive information. Regardless of the reliability of the classification
process and regardless of the trustworthiness of the executive
branch, the fact that so many documents are classified-and thus
unobtainable-and the importance of free availability of information about the government in a society such as ours mandate that
there be disinterested oversight of executive-branch use of the
classification stamp to deny requests for government-controlled
information. That the current political regime is unlikely to take
action towards assuring such oversight in no way detracts from
the urgent need for that action.
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